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Abstract
This  paper  systematises  problems  in  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  (ENP)
implementation  in  three  fields  of  research  and  analyses  them  within  the  external
governance framework, in order to find reasons for ENP's little effectiveness. Based on
two  research  questions  and  by  comparing  internal  structural  problems  in  the  EU,
domestic  factors  in  partner  countries  and  international  influence  to  effectiveness
conditions from external governance theory, the thesis narrows down key aspects that
the external policy's effectiveness depends on. The author's own contribution is the most
evidently  expressed  in  the  third  part  where  findings  are  compared  to  theory  and
analysed via empirical evidence. The most decisive aspects were found to be domestic
factors in partner countries, such as political regime, the interests of governments, lack
of democracy, national challenges and possible conflicts in partner countries. However,
internal contradictions of the ENP structure – such as EU inconsistency in conditionality
application, lack of consensus and focus, conflicting goals, inappropriate one-size fits-
all structure and not offering a motivating enough outcome for conducting reforms –
and  international  variables,  such as  the  projection  of  EU as  a  soft  power,  regional
competition, possible alternatives to EU integration and Russian foreign policy in its
near  abroad,  have also had its  influence on ENP's  performance in  some cases.  The
analysis in this paper proves the hypothesis that external policy's effectiveness depends
more on external factors than on the policy's internal structure.
Table of Contents
Introduction.......................................................................................................................5
Methodology......................................................................................................................7
1. Introduction to European Neighbourhood Policy........................................................10
1.1. Path dependence and conditionality in European studies....................................10
1.2. Institutional establishment of the policy..............................................................13
1.3. Possible definitions in previous studies...............................................................16
2. External governance theory in European Union studies.............................................18
2.1. Establishing the idea of external governance.......................................................18
2.2. Elements and variations of external governance model......................................21
2.3. Theoretical expectations: conditions for an effective external governance.........24
3. Problems in European Neighbourhood Policy implementation..................................28
3.1. Accomplishments and state of play......................................................................28
3.2. Internal structural problems in the European Union............................................30
3.3. International influence and Russian foreign policy.............................................36
3.4. Domestic factors in partner countries..................................................................38
4. Problems in comparison with external governance model..........................................41
4.1. Analysis of European Neighbourhood Policy's effectiveness..............................41
4.2. Generalisations and conclusions..........................................................................53
4.3. Challenges and recommendations........................................................................55
4.4. Renewed approach in European Neighbourhood Policy.....................................57
Conclusion.......................................................................................................................60
Estonian abstract..............................................................................................................62
References.......................................................................................................................63
Abbreviations
AA Association Agreement
CEE(C) Central and Eastern European countries
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
EaP Eastern Partnership
EaPIC Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation
EEAS European External Action Service
ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
EU European Union
EuroMed Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
HR EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
MEDA Measures d'Accompagnement (French for accompanying measures)
MENA Middle East and North Africa
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PI Partnership Instrument
UfM Union for the Mediterranean
TACIS Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
Introduction
There are three general ways for the European Union (EU) to organise relations with its
proximate countries: pre-accession, the European Economic Area and association1. As
part  of  EU external  action,  European Neighbourhood  Policy (ENP)  seems to  entail
aspects  from  all  three,  with  a  hint  of  development  cooperation  and  democracy
promotion.  Even  though  the  officially  proclaimed  objective to achieve the closest
possible political association and economic integration with the partner countries falls
short of an actual membership, the policy is likely to affect its target countries as well as
EU members in future more than they may expect.
The main goal of ENP was to create an associated area of peaceful, prosperous,
democratic, politically and economically stable countries around EU external border.
Ten years  after  its  inception,  it  has  not  been as  successful  as  expected  in  terms  of
reaching this goal. The policy has not had “the kind of impact its founders had hoped it
would  have”2.  This  notion  has  triggered  a  significant  increase  of  critique  in  ENP
discourse, some are even on the opinion that ENP is on the verge of a failure3, especially
in recent years when ENP has become a politically prominent issue not only on the EU
agenda, but in EU-Russia relations as well.
Therefore, the thesis aims to find reasons for why ENP has not succeeded in what
it expected to  – why ten years later, an associated area of peaceful democratic stable
countries in the EU's proximate neighbourhood has not been established. For reaching
the aim, the thesis will assort main problems and critical variables that were decisive in
determining the course of ENP, within the policy itself, the EU, among domestic factors
in partner countries and possible external influence. In order to rationalise ENP's little
success, two research questions will be explored: 1) what are the EU internal structural
1 Bechev, Dimitar, Nicolaidis, Kalypso (2010) „From Policy to Polity: Can the EU's Special Relations
with its ‘Neighbourhood’ be Decentred?“, JCMS, Abstract
2 Andrew Wilson to Radio Free Europe (2010) „Interview: After just one year, are the wheels coming
off the EU's Eastern Partnership?“, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Online, 7 May 2010
3 For example, Wiśniewski, Paweł Dariusz (2013) “The Eastern Partnership – it is high time to start a
real  “partnership””,  Carnegie  Moscow  Center;  Kirchherr,  Julian  (2012)  „The  European
Neighbourhood Policy has failed because of its own contradictions and small budget“, London School
of  Economics,  14.07.2012;  Babayan,  Nelli  (2011)  „Armenia:  why  the  European  Neighbourhood
Policy has failed“, FRIDE Policy Brief, No 68, February 2011
problems and external factors that have affected the ENP performance; and 2) to what
extent ENP meets the conditions for effective external governance – the main theoretical
approach used for explaining EU's role beyond its borders.
ENP has become a popular research theme in international relations and political
science and  has been approached from various angles, such as geopolitical bordering,
security  calculations,  democracy  promotion  or  conditionality  model.  With  abundant
empirical  material  it  might  seem a  slightly  overstudied  research  field,  yet,  it  lacks
proper systematization and integral evaluation. Therefore, the added value of this thesis
is  systematizing previous  research on problems in ENP implementation and placing
them under external  governance framework. The paper compares the problems with
theoretical conditions under which external governance is considered to be more or less
effective and evaluates to what extent these conditions are met in practice, in order to
narrow down key determinants for ENP's success.
Over time, the EU has re-defined the means and focus of ENP aiming to improve
its structure and implementation. In March 2014, the Parliament and Council adopted
regulation establishing a new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)4 which aims
to revise, update and improve parts of the ENP framework to increase its efficiency5.
But  in  order  to  improve  a  policy,  one  must  first  understand  problems  that  were
responsible  for the deficiencies in  the previous one,  which can be concluded as the
research problem that the research in this paper aims to solve.
The main body of the thesis is divided into four sections that reflect and refer to
one another throughout the paper: ENP introduction, theory, practice and analysis. First,
the institutional  establishment and definitions of ENP are introduced. The second part
provides  background and claims  of  external  governance  theory in  European studies
(theory).  The  third  part  consists  in  systematising  problems  in  ENP implementation
(practice) and the fourth analyses to what extent ENP practice meets the conditions for
an effective external governance (analysis). The last part also provides insight to what
the new ENI, entering into force in 2014, is about, and offers empirical evidence and
case studies to support arguments of ENP critique.
4 European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) is an instrument for funding EU external assistance under
ENP – it will replace the previous ENPI which ran out at the end of 2013.
5 See chapter 4.4. Renewed approach in European Neighbourhood Policy
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Methodology
The paper  conducts  a  conceptual  analysis  of  the EU and ENP, using a  quantitative
empirical analysis method, relying on secondary sources. Research problem is solved
and aim achieved by conducting two research tasks (see Table 1), whereas  the first is
needed to answer the second and they both provide input for reaching the research aim.
By  conducting  a  conceptual  analysis,  this  research  tests  whether  external  policy's
effectiveness depends more on external factors than on the policy's internal structure, or
not. The following Table 1 sums up the general research design of the thesis:
Table 1. Research design
Research problem: a policy cannot be renewed to be more successful,
if it is not clear what went wrong the first time
Research aim: to find why the ENP goal has not been achieved
Hypothesis: external policy's effectiveness depends more on external factors
than on the policy's internal structure
Research questions:
1. What are the EU internal structural problems and external factors
that have affected ENP performance?
2. To what extent ENP meets the conditions for effective external governance?
Before  moving  to  the  core  of  the  thesis,  an  introduction  to  the  institutional
establishment  and  possible  definitions  of  ENP  is  provided  in  the  first  part.  Path
dependence theory and conditionality model are represented as well,  in order to cover
necessary background for understanding both, external governance theory and ENP in
practice.
The  second  part  establishes  the  background,  main  authors,  elements  and
variations  of  external  governance  model  which,  in  comparison  with  other  relevant
approaches, has greater ability to explain ENP developments in particular.  The author
gathered claims and rules from the works of Lavenex, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
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to establish a list of conditions under which external governance is considered to be
more or less effective. These conditions are systematised for empirical research by three
categories – internal structural, international and domestic factors in partner countries.
Literature in the third part is structured by the same categories of research where
arguments are grouped by problems they address. Empirical part consists of contrasting
and combining findings of noted authors such as Emerson, Popescu, Johansson-Nogués,
Smith, Comelli,  Fischer and Lannon. In order to maintain the comprehensibility and
practicality of the paper,  research is complemented with  relevant examples and case
studies on countries in the policy's East and South dimensions throughout the paper.
In short, there are two limits for selecting materials for empirical research: based
on when they were published and what their content is about, to assort critical reviews
from the past four years that were accessible for the author. Some earlier publications
are referred to as well, under ENP definitions for example. While reviewing literature,
the  attention  is  on  mapping  problems  that  various  authors  emphasise  as  the  most
influential to ENP's course, in the hope of identifying patterns that could be compared to
external governance model, as an attempt to test the boundaries of existing research. As
a result of literature review in part three,  the author establishes a systematized list of
ENP problems and answers the first research question.
The added value of this research and the author's own contribution is the most
evident in the fourth part where critical analysis evaluates to what extent ENP practice
complies with theoretical expectations – how well the policy meets the effectiveness
conditions  from  external  governance  theory.  While  answering  the  second  research
question, the  paper  offers  possible  rationalisation  for  why ENP goal  has  not  been
achieved. This systematisation and analysis would improve the general understanding of
the policy's effectiveness by not just highlighting its problems, but narrowing down the
decisive aspects that determine the course and success of ENP.
There are several ways to approach this topic and solve the research problem.
The author considered possibilities of conducting a  case study and viewing primary
empirical data on a few countries in particular – either one from both dimensions or one
of the more modernised countries and one among the less successful ones – there are
various  options  for  selecting  individual  cases.  However,  external  governance  theory
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posits expectations rather about an external policy in general – i.e. its implementation
measures, consistency of EU offer, interdependence between EU and third countries.
Thus,  empirical  study  for  testing  this  theory  needs  to  be  on  the  same  degree  of
generalisation  in  order  to  be  comparable.  Therefore,  the  author  chose  to  conduct  a
critical  policy analysis  and use  secondary sources  to  cover  as  many aspects  of  the
policy's performance as possible.
Possible problems can occur with this research method, especially regarding the
amount of materials the author aims to use in the third part. It can be overwhelming to
address three fields of problems: internal, international and domestic factors in partner
countries. Previously described limits for selecting materials will help to narrow down
the content. Plus, it would be worth considering that this idea of categorising problems
came up during the writing process, when key arguments of ENP critique were gathered
and needed to be ordered systematically.
There are  two points  to  consider  before reading the thesis.  First,  the topic is
subject to political change: by spring 2014, ENP has become a rather problematic case,
regarding the crisis in Ukraine, Russian foreign policy and course changes in EU-Russia
relations within the past couple of months. Although the author started writing the thesis
long before this contingency, the issue of ENP has now become even more important on
the EU agenda, whereas some of the arguments have found more ground in the past
months and opened up a range of possibilities for further research.
Second, the author acknowledges that any policy assessment depends on how
success  or  effectiveness  is  measured  which  is  a  controversial  matter  in  itself.  The
starting point may not even be how the policy is conducted in practice or whether it has
measurable results or not, instead, it might as well lie in the expectations on the policy,
which  makes  its  measurability  even  more  doubtable.  Therefore,  the  thesis  does  not
attempt to solve the issue of evaluating or defining success or effectiveness as such, but
considers each author's position on it in the context of their study.
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1. Introduction to European Neighbourhood Policy
1.1. Path dependence and conditionality in European studies
One of the prerequisites for ENP to function, is using the strategy of conditionality6 that
has previously been used as the main element in EU pre-accession process. Derived
from using a prior model of incentives in relations to third countries, ENP and the idea
of EU external governance are sometimes  said to have been shaped by existing EU
institutions  or  previous  patterns  of  foreign  policy7.  On  that  note,  this  sub-chapter
provides insight to the role and impact of path dependence theory and conditionality
model in European neighbourhood studies.
Path dependence, as part of a wider neo-institutionalist theory, is about previous
institutional decisions affecting future policies. It  claims that political outcomes, rules
and routines are emerging from earlier experiences and previous institutional behaviour,
where decisions have already been taken that no longer allow changing the  course.
Institutions in that sense become stuck and dependent on the path that was determined
by their past practices. Moreover, it becomes costly or even impossible to reverse the
particular courses of action, whereas political arrangements are notably hard to change8.
“Once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high”9,
which is why path dependence will induce further movement in the same direction – a
tendency that Pierson calls the idea of “increasing returns”10.
Similar developments can be found in the process of European integration, where
steps have been taken that no longer allow turning back or where “path jumping” would
6 Schimmelfennig, Frank, Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2004) “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to
the  candidate  countries  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe”,  Journal  of  European  Public  Policy,  Vol
11(4):671
7 Lavenex, Sandra, Schimmelfennig, Frank (2009) „EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external
governance in European politics“, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol 16(6):802; Lavenex, Sandra
(2004) "EU external governance in 'wider Europe'", Journal of European Public Policy, Vol 11(4):686
8 Pierson,  Paul  (2000)  “Increasing  returns,  Path  dependence,  and  the  Study of  Politics”,  American
Political Science Review, Vol 94(2):251, 262
9 Levi, Margareth (1997) „A model, a method, and a map: rational choice in comparative and historical
analysis“, p 28; in Lichbach, Mark Irving, Zuckerman, Alan S. „Comparative Politics: Rationality,
Culture, and Structure“, Cambridge University Press
10 Pierson, 2000:252
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imply high costs for institutional adaptation11. It is not only the ENP that subsumed the
patchwork of existing EU policy instruments12, there are developments in other policy
fields as well that can be explained by historical institutionalism, sequencing or path
dependence, such as agricultural policy in the EU13 or the creation of customs union14.
ENP shows a  high  level  of  path  dependence  particularly deriving  from EU's
enlargement policy.  ENP – as well  as EU external governance theory – came about
before the Fifth EU enlargement round15 when the Union's largest single expansion to
date put its  international  role  to  a whole new perspective.  Concerns about the EU's
integration capacity, possible exhaustion of the enlargement model and the emerging
necessity  to  engage  with  the  new cross-border  countries  set  the  path  of  no  return.
Ground was set for establishing alternative approaches to the Unions' relations with its
near abroad, leading to ENP and external governance theory.
The  conditionality  principle,  at  first  mostly  used  in  financial  assistance
programmes of the World Bank or IMF where forms of cooperation were established on
certain  conditions,  has  “gradually  found  its  place  and  role  also  in  NATO  and  EU
negotiations”16.  At the EU level, conditionality was first used during the pre-accession
negotiations  of  CEE countries  when Copenhagen criteria17 was  introduced  in  1993.
Conditionality is formed around the logic of motivation: if a country wishes to achieve a
certain relationship with another, it is expected and required to conduct a set of reforms.
In  EU  conditionality,  the  EU  sets  its  rules  and  goals  as  conditions  that  the
countries are expected to fulfil in order to receive benefits or a certain relationship with
11 Holzinger,  Katharina,  Knill,  Christoph  (2002)  “Path  dependencies  in  European  integration:  a
constructive  response  to  German  foreign  minister  Joschka  Fischer”,  Public  Administration,  Vol
80(1):149
12 Matano,  Alessia,  Ramos,  Raul  (2013)  „The  European  Neighbourhood  Policy:  towards  a  better
integration of migrants in the EU“, European Policy Brief, SEARCH Project (ongoing):1
13 See for example Lasan, Nicoleta (2012) „Can Historical Institutionalism Explain the Reforms of the
Common Agricultural Policy?“, Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol 12(1), 05.03.2012
14 Moravcsik, Andrew (2005) “Sequencing and path dependence in European integration”, Conference
on the sequencing of regional economic integration: Issues in the Breadth and Depth of Economic
Integration in the Americas, Mendoza College of Business, Notre Dame, September 2005
15 The 2004 and 2007 enlargements are together referred to as the Fifth EU enlargement round, also
known as the Big Bang enlargement, when 12 countries from Eastern and Southern Europe joined the
EU: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Cyprus
in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.
16 Mocanu, Oana (2010) “Brief overview on the Conditionality in the European Neighbourhood Policy”,
Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol 10(4):43
17 EU accession criteria – a set of political, economic and administrative criteria that any country that
wishes to join the EU must meet, agreed upon by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993
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the EU in return.  Under  a strategy of “reinforcement by reward”,  the EU agrees to
deliver a reward only if the target government complies with pre-defined conditions,
and withholds a reward, if it fails to do so18. Although conditionality was sometimes
perceived by the candidate states as an element of constraint19 or an attempt to alter
countries' behaviour or policies20, it soon became a popular instrument for reinforcing
reforms and a key element in EU enlargement policy.
In  case  a  reward  is  accompanied  by  a  potential  withdrawal,  reduction  or
suspension  of  the  advantages,  threat  of  negative  consequences,  or  even  possible
sanctions as a last resort in the absence of reforms, the model becomes by definition a
negative conditionality21. Using a negative incentives model is somewhat controversial,
as it can cause countries to adopt and comply with EU rules mainly because ignoring or
violating them would be less beneficial or could create opportunity costs22. Although in
practice, the EU has tended to prefer using positive conditionality over negative one23,
they are both intended to reinforce certain developments.
EU  conditionality  is  best  explained  by  an  external  incentives  model  of
governance.  In  comparison  to  other  alternatives  such  as  lesson-drawing  or  social
learning, the dominant logic underpinning the external incentives model is a rationalist
bargaining strategy24.  Given the highly asymmetrical relationship between EU actors
and outsiders and the difference between an EU rule and status quo in a target country,
introducing  external  incentives  for  compliance  with  EU  rules  opens  a  bargaining
process where the target government seeks to balance international, EU and domestic
pressures, and maximize its own political benefits at the same time25.
In principle, by introducing external rules to third countries, conditionality has
sometimes been criticised for illegitimate interference to the domestic affairs of another
18 Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2004:671
19 Mocanu, 2010:43
20 Jeffrey T., Checkel, (2000) „Compliance and Conditionality“,  ARENA Working Papers, WP 00/18,
University of Oslo, 15.09.2000;
21 Mocanu, 2010:46-47
22 Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009:799
23 Smith, Karen E. (2005b) „Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?“, p
23-29; in Youngs, Richard, Emerson, Michael, Smith, Karen E., Whitman, Richard, „Report 2: New
Terms of Engagement“, Global Europe, Foreign Policy Centre, London
24 Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2004:670, 671
25 Ibid., p 672, 683
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country  as  a  challenge  to  state  sovereignty26.  Moreover,  political  requirements  for
democratisation  coming  from  the  EU  can  be  criticised  for  being  duplicitous  or
hypocritical, given the fact that the EU itself suffers from a democratic deficit within its
institutions27.  Then again,  these concerns about the lack of democracy are argued to
have been misplaced28 which supports the legitimacy of EU democratic conditionality.
In any case, the logic of ENP gravitates around the conditionality principle: the
more  the  ENP partners  develop their  societies,  the more the EU deepens economic
integration and political association. In enlargement policy, the conditionality model and
incentives had brought significant positive outcomes and the model was expected to
achieve  similar  accomplishments  in  ENP.  However,  there  is  one  major  difference
between EU conditionality in ENP and the one used in pre-accession. Within the ENP
framework,  EU  conditionality  is  missing  the  most  important  motivation  for
modernisation and reform – EU membership perspective – the absence of which has
become a key argument for ENP critique, as will be seen in the next part of the thesis.
1.2. Institutional establishment of the policy
There are numerous countries that do not fulfil the Copenhagen criteria for becoming an
EU candidate and might not even wish to do so, but whose association in some political
processes is beneficial for the EU and vice versa, i.e. Switzerland, Norway or in ENP's
case the proximate cross-border countries. In 2003 when the issue of associating with
neighbours came up on EU agenda, “interdependence – political and economic – with
the Union's neighbourhood was already a reality”29. ENP provides a workable solution
for this interdependence and enables cooperation with strategically important countries.
26 See Smith, Karen E. (1998) „The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third
Countries: How Effective?“, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol 3(2):256
27 See for example, Jensen, Thomas (2009) „The Democratic Deficit of the European Union“, Living
Reviews in Democracy, Vol 1
28 See for example, Crombez, Christophe (2003) „The Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Much
Ado about Nothing?“, European Union Politics, Vol 4(1):101-120; Moravscik,  Andrew (2002) „In
defence  of  the  'Democratic  Deficit':  Reassessing  Legitimacy in  the  European  Union“,  Journal  of
Common Market Studies, Vol 40(4):603-624
29 Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (2003)  „Wider  Europe  –  Neighbourhood:  A  New
Framework  for  Relations  with  our  Eastern  and  Southern  Neighbours“,  Communication  from the
Commission, COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11.03.2003
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Initiated by possible partnership ideas proposed in 2002 and 200330, ENP as a
strategic policy was launched in 200431 – the year of EU's largest single expansion to
date. Each new enlargement does not only add member states – by shifting the external
border, the EU also gains new cross-border countries in their proximate neighbourhood.
2004 is  when  „a range of poorer, economically and politically less stable and less
democratic countries bordered the EU and in response to these changing circumstances
the need was felt to create a unified policy towards these countries“32.
The main concern in 2004 was to avoid creating new dividing lines in Europe33,
so, integration with third countries in the form of ENP was seen as a potential solution.
It is valuable for the EU to maintain some sort of control in its neighbouring countries
and  foster  democratic  developments  for  preventing  possible  spill-over  of  problems.
With a vision of creating  an associated area of peaceful, democratic and prosperous
countries, ENP is about sharing “the benefits of the EU with neighbouring countries,
thus helping to strengthen stability, security and well-being for all concerned“34. By so
doing, the EU aims to foster commercial relations and alleviate economic disparities.
ENP is therefore said to be a mutually beneficial policy: on one hand, it is about
supporting and assisting countries in need of development and modernisation in their
economy, promoting democracy and sharing European values, on the other hand, it is
about  the  EU trying  to  achieve  security,  stability  and  control  around their  external
border. This dual purpose is later contested by claims of EU self-interest and criticised
for being based on EU values rather than partner countries' needs.
The policy applies to 16 countries in EU's immediate neighbourhood by land or
sea:  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Georgia,  Moldova,  and Ukraine in the East,  and
Algeria,  Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya,  Morocco, the Palestinian Authority,
Syria and Tunisia in the Mediterranean35.  Geographically and cooperatively,  they are
30 Prodi, Romano (2002) "A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability", speech  given at
the Sixth ECSA-World Conference „Peace, Security And Stability International Dialogue and the Role
of the EU", Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002; COM(2003) 104 final
31 Commission  of  the  European  Communities  (2004)  „European  Neighbourhood  Policy  –  Strategy
Paper“, Communication from the Commission, COM(2004) 373 final,  Brussels, 12.05.2004
32 Borell et al. (2012) „Report on ENP Policy Concerning its Objectives and Policy Measures over Time,
SEARCH Project, Deliverable 1.2:1
33 Comelli, Michele (2004) „The challenges of the European Neighbourhood Policy“, The International
Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol 39(3):98,104
34 European Commission's website: ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/neighbourhood_policy
35 Although Russia and Turkey lie in the EU's immediate neighbourhood, Russia is considered to be one
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divided  into  Eastern  Partnership  (EaP),  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership
(EuroMed/UfM, formerly known as the Barcelona Process) and Black Sea Synergy36. At
large, these can be looked upon as the policy's East and South dimensions, respectively.
Cooperation with these countries bases on bilateral agreements and Action Plans
(APs) – the core of ENP conditionality, containing democratic reforms on one end and
(financial)  incentives  on  the  other.  APs  lay  out  the  strategic  objectives  of  the
cooperation in three main fields of activity: democratic reforms, economic development
and border control. The plans are notably detailed on Justice and Home Affairs, where
the  EU  aims  to  prevent  and  combat  illegal  immigration,  smuggling  and  human
trafficking, but to encourage legal migration and controlled cross-border movement via
liberalisation of Schengen visa regime at the same time37. It would be worth to note that
not all 16 countries have agreed on ENP APs: Algeria is currently negotiating a one, but
Belarus, Libya and Syria remain outside most of the ENP structures38.
In addition to general priorities and goals, APs comprise a specific list of actions
and  measures  for  each  partner  country  to  implement.  For  example,  to  establish
economic growth and stability, advance trade liberalisation and entrepreneurship, avoid
corruption and black economy, each partner is expected to develop a prudent monetary
and  fiscal  policy,  improve  access  to  financial  services,  address  administrative,
legislative and regulatory obstacles to the creation and development of firms, remove
restrictions on capital flows, undertake institutional and judiciary reforms and support
research and development39. As a reward in return for conducting reforms – according to
the  previously  introduced  conditionality  model  –,  a  country  would  receive  certain
benefits, such as EU market access, visa-liberalisation or financial support.
The main difference between the East and South dimensions lies in the fields in
which they cooperate with the EU. UfM aims to  address soft security areas such as
economy,  environment,  energy,  health,  migration  and  culture,  whereas  EaP is  more
of the strategic partners of the EU, therefore, relations with Russia are defined by a bilateral strategic
partnership agreement, and Turkey is an EU candidate country, undergoing a pre-accession process.
36 European Commission's website: ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/neighbourhood_policy
37 Barbé,  Esther,  Johansson-Nogués,  Elisabeth  (2008),  „The  EU  as  a  modest  'force  for  good':  the
European Neighbourhood Policy“, International Affairs, Vol 84(1):86
38 EEAS website: eeas.europa.eu/enp
39 European Commission's website: ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/neighbourhood_policy/
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intended to promote political and economic development40. Since 2009,  EaP involves
negotiating a new generation of Association Agreements (AA) with six countries in
Eastern Europe and South Caucasus41 to achieve even greater economic, political, social
and cultural integration. It offers post-communist countries the opportunity to enhance
cooperation with the EU in areas that the ENP of 16 countries does not.
As a result, a unique policy initiative was formed that is neither pre-accession,
EU foreign policy, EEA, nor development cooperation, although it has been said to have
implications to all  of the above.  During the evolution of the policy from the Wider
Europe initiative in  2003 to EuroMed and UfM in 2008 and Eastern Partnership in
2009, researchers have been aiming to define the concept of ENP, highlighting in turns
aspects that they see being the most dominant.
1.3. Possible definitions in previous studies
There is no common understanding or definition of ENP. Some say it is a substitute for
enlargement42,  an imposed partnership43, a counter-offer44, a desire for homogenisation
and standardisation45, a mutual agreement or a pact shaped by EU self-interest46. While
ENP conditionality  is  about  promising  access  to  EU  internal  market  in  return  for
reforms, a large part of literature is devoted to analysing international trade, aid and the
effects of trade liberalization47. Partner countries could be defined as a ring of friends48,
a source of threat49 outsiders50 or a buffer zone51 between the EU's inside and outside (or
40 EEAS website: www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed; www.eeas.europa.eu/eastern
41 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine
42 Cadier, David (2013) „Is the European Neighbourhood Policy a substitute for enlargement?“, IDEAS
report SR018, London School of Economics and Political Science, 17.12.2013; Smith, 2005a:Abstract
43 Johansson-Nogués, 2008:81-96
44 Mocanu, 2010:42
45 Browning, Christopher S., Joenniemi, Pertti (2008) „Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood
Policy“, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14(3):521
46 Borell et al., 2012:4
47 Wesselink,  Edzard,  Boschma,  Ron  (2012)  „Taking  Stock  of  Research  Projects  on  the  European
Neighbourhood Policy“, WP01/01 SEARCH Working paper, Utrecht University, January 2012:4
48 Johansson-Nogués, Elisabeth (2006) „Profiles: A ‘Ring of Friends’? The Implications of the European
Neighbourhood Policy for the Mediterranean“, Mediterranean Politics, Vol 9(2):240-247
49 Balfour, Rosa, Missiroli, Antonio (2007) „Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy“, EPC
Issue Paper No.54, June 2007:25-30
50 Smith, 2005a:757-773
51 Walters,  William  (2004)  ‘The  Frontiers  of  the  European  Union:  A  Geostrategic  Perspective’,
Geopolitics, Vol 9(3):674–698; Del Sarto, Rafaella A. and Tobias Schumacher (2005) „From EMP to
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the EU and Russia)52. The intersection of these explanations is the desire to understand
what the ENP is about and how it aims to organise the broader European space.
The policy was intended to overcome the logic of inclusion  versus exclusion53.
Enlargement – often praised for being the most successful EU foreign policy – might in
some sense become a victim of its own success: “with each enlargement, the number of
'European' non-member countries that qualify as potential member states decreases and
the debate on where 'Europe' ought to end becomes more divisive”54.  ENP seems to
embody the EU's attempt to cope with the accession-rejection dilemma, by offering
some form of association and interdisciplinary connection with the EU that falls short of
an actual membership threshold, but is not merely foreign policy either.
With regard to how the neighbourhood was projected among the EU member
states after the Fifth EU enlargement, it can be said that the ENP was founded upon the
assumption  that  certain countries  will  presumably act  in  a  certain way.  A paradigm
became  popular  in  the  EU  that  the  new  cross-border  countries  are  economically
unstable, non-democratic, politically corrupt, socially divided, and struggling to provide
civil  freedoms  and  respect  for  human  rights  to  an  extent  considered  necessary  in
Europe.  If  it  were  not  for  these  presumptions  about  the  proximate  neighbouring
countries, there would not have been the need to create a joint partnership system.
The EU has been said to be rather vulnerable towards developments across its
borders and from a psychological perspective, the standardisation and democratisation
of what some might call Europeanisation, helps the EU to overcome the fear of the
unknown. This perception may derive from democratic peace theory which posits that
democratic countries are unlikely or hesitant to engage in an armed conflict with one
another55. Accordingly, the EU is promoting democratic values and reforms in countries
around its external border. Even if ENP countries would not receive the prospect of EU
membership, they play a crucial role in maintaining security and stability in Europe.
ENP:  What's  at  Stake  with  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  towards  the  Southern
Mediterranean?“, European Foreign Affairs Review Vol 10(1):17–38
52 Browning, Joenniemi, 2008:520; 
53 Comelli,  Michele, Greco, Ettore, Tocci, Nathalie (2006) „From Boundary to Borderland:
Transforming the Meaning of Borders in Europe through the European Neighbourhood Policy“,
Project No 513416, EU-CONSENT, working paper:2
54 Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009:793
55 The idea dates back to the 18th century, main theorists being Immanuel Kant and Thomas Paine.
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2. External governance theory in European Union studies
2.1. Establishing the idea of external governance
The EU has had multiple enlargement rounds and signed a number of economic and
political agreements with third countries to enhance transnational cooperation. Several
integration theories aim to explain these developments: neofunctionalist ideas clarify the
regional integration across multiple sectors and the emergence of intergovernmentalism
in Europe, supranationalists justify the creation of independent international institutions
that gave floor to institutionalism. Over time, there have been occasionally prevailing
approaches to  European integration,  but which set  of ideas is  capable of explaining
subsequent developments, including the construction and implementation of ENP?
Due to ENP's evolving nature –  and EU's evolving nature –, there is no single
complete way to explain its developments. Certain theories offer reasoning to limited
aspects of ENP: path dependence as a way to explain policy-making in international
relations,  institutionalism  as  an  explanation  to  developing  a  supranational  policy
initiative,  intergovernmentalism where  success  on an  EU level  does  not  necessarily
mean success on a national level, external governance as an explanation to evolving
relations patterns with the third countries since the beginning of 1990s, or conditionality
as a core functioning principle of various EU policies.
Comparing these theories and their ability to explain ENP performance, external
governance  model,  especially  the  assessable  conditions  it  entails,  has  the  capability
needed  to  explain  EU  role  in  external  affairs  targeted  at  third  countries  and  ENP
framework in particular. Inspired by debates in international relations and comparative
politics,  external  governance  is  a  fairly  recent  development  in  European  studies,
emerging as a new form of theorising EU external affairs in the early 2000s. This makes
it is also the most recent theory, compared to other approaches.
Given its novelty and focus on EU relations with third countries in particular, the
author expects its relevancy in evaluating the current neighbourhood policy to be high.
However, it is important to keep in mind that in social sciences one cannot expect a
theory to  offer  a  certain  knowledge,  unquestionable  facts  or  an  absolute  truth,  and
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external governance is no exception. The model can provide generalisations on possible
tendencies  and  presumable  contingencies,  yet,  they  remain  arguable.  Furthermore,
similar to all theoretical approaches, external governance model may be developed and
changed over time – its authors have already modified their assertions over the years
and will probably continue so doing as the modes of governance evolve in practice.
By late 1990s, Europeanisation and EU governance studies had already expanded
their  focus  from member  states  to  accession  process,  potential  candidates  or  quasi-
members like Norway or Switzerland56. First academic debates on the boundaries of EU
governance  in  1999  by  Friis  and  Murphy57 or  in  2002  by  Filtenborg,  Gänzle  and
Johansson58 applied the notion of external governance to either CEE countries, eastern
enlargement, Baltic Sea region or Northern Europe. But in 2004, a global governance
professor Sandra Lavenex argued that external governance reaches well beyond these
limited geographical regions and addresses all EU neighbourhood countries in one way
or another59.  Defined as a form of interdependence where internal rules are extended
beyond formal membership group, external governance soon became one of the main
explanations for integrating third countries into the European system of rules60.
At first, Lavenex suggested that external governance takes place at the bilateral
level through association agreements but five years later,  she elaborated the view to
external  governance  and  concluded  that  it  can  be  applied  to  various  forms  of
cooperation from EEA and ENP to negotiated bilateral agreements61. In collaboration
with Schimmelfennig, they added that it can even “emerge spontaneously when mutual
interdependence  is  high  and  adaptation  to  EU templates  meets  the  interest  of  third
countries”62.  Although the actual mode, type and effectiveness of external governance
may vary, there are some core characteristics and elements that describe EU external
governance in general.
56 Schimmelfennig,  Frank  (2007)  “Europeanization  beyond  Europe”,  Living  Reviews  in  European
Governance, Vol 2(1):1-22; Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009:793
57 Friis,  Lykke,  Murphy,  Anna  (1999)  „The  European  Union  and  Central  and  Eastern  Europe:
governance and boundaries“, JCMS, Vol 37(2):211–232
58 Filtenborg,  Mette  Sicard,  Gänzle,  Stefan,  Johansson,  Elisabeth  (2002)  „An alternative  theoretical
approach  to  EU foreign  policy.  „Network  governance“  and  the  case  of  the  Northern  Dimension
Initiative“, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol 37(4):387–407
59 Lavenex, 2004:682-683
60 Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009
61 Ibid., p 792, 807; Lavenex, 2004:690
62 Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009:792
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2.2. Elements and variations of external governance model
By definition, a crucial criterion for external governance is its legal and institutional
boundaries,  i.e.  the  limit  of  what  will  be  shared  beyond  EU  borders.  External
governance consists in selective extension of certain EU norms, rules and policies – the
legal boundary – while precluding possible membership – the institutional boundary63.
This means sharing parts of the acquis communautaire64 beyond the circle of member
states towards their immediate neighbours, but at the same time, cautiously preventing
the institutional inclusion of what an actual EU accession would mean.
Less than a government, more than a cooperation, external governance can be
characterised from an institutional perspective by its horizontal nature, focus on process
rather than output, its inclusive character and emphasis on voluntary instruments instead
of legal obligations65. The idea of external governance is mainly about the projection of
soft power and the extension of rules in so-called soft security areas, such as justice and
home affairs, environmental and energy policy66. Since this inclusion of external players
in some traditionally domestic political processes is based on voluntarism, the extent to
which  third  countries  are  willing  to  adapt  to  predetermined EU norms and rules  is
dependant in how the EU is perceived internationally.
Most of the time, the EU has been seen more as a civilian power or an economic
community with relatively weak defence capacity, but since the CFSP was introduced,
hints of a common defence dimension started to emerge67. The ENP vision of creating
an area of freedom, security and justice and the perception of interdependence in this
context, blurs the traditional distinction between internal and external security68 which
leads to combining internal issues with foreign policy for two simultaneous objectives.
External governance is said to fulfil a dual purpose, meaning,  it does not only
63 Lavenex, 2004:680, 681, 683, 694
64 Official term for EU legislation – the entire body of law, policies and practices evolved in the EU
65 Lavenex,  Sandra  (2008)  "A  governance  perspective  on  the  European  neighbourhood  policy:
integration beyond conditionality?", Journal of European Public Policy, Vol 15(6):940
66 Lavenex, 2004:680-700
67 See  Rehn, Olli (2008) „The EU – from civilian power to premier league security policy player?“,
Speech at the Forum of Heads of Mission, Helsinki, 27.08.2008; Smith, Karen E. (2000) „The End of
Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?“, The International Spectator,  Vol
35(2):11-28
68 Lavenex, 2004:689
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serve as a foreign policy model, but it “may follow functional needs when it is seen to
increase the efficiency and problem-solving capacity of internal policies”69. Combining
a foreign policy strategy of stabilisation and security with third countries'  pursuit  of
internal policy goals may be interpreted as a cognizant way for the EU to benefit from
third  countries'  political  and  material  problem-solving  resources70.  For  example,  by
managing trade relations and migration, the EU could potentially address shortages in
some  internal  fields,  while  aiming  to  establish  regional  security  and  stability  in
collaboration with third countries.
These characteristics make external governance remarkably context-dependent71
and  varying  across  countries,  regions  and  policy  fields. Structurally,  Lavenex,
Schimmelfennig  and  Sedelmeier  distinguish three  modes  of external  governance:
hierarchy,  network  and  market.  Hierarchical  governance  is  a  formalised  vertical
relationship  of  domination  and  subordination,  based  on  non-negotiable  enforceable
rules,  binding  prescriptions  and  supranational  authoritative  law,  which,  in  the  EU
context, is often associated with the traditional “Community method” of policy-making.
Formal  procedures,  precise  rules,  monitoring  and  possible  sanctioning  are  not  only
associated  with  hierarchical  mode,  but  also  necessary prerequisites  for  an  effective
exercise of external incentives conditionality.72
Given  its  prescriptive  quality,  hierarchical  mode  of  external  governance  is
sometimes associated with EU international normative power which is another field of
research73.  External  incentives  model  of  conditionality  could  cause  EU  rules  to  be
interpreted as normative, prescriptive or imposed towards third countries and/or their
citizens74 from the outside/above – much like attitudes evolving in CEE countries when
pre-accession conditionality was first introduced. Certain types of external governance,
especially  the  hierarchical  mode,  “undermine  important  sections  of  third  countries'
autonomy  over  their  legislation”75,  similar  to  sovereignty  concerns  in  nationalist
69 Ibid., p 681
70 Ibid., p 694
71 Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2004:676
72 Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009:796-797
73 See  for  example  Whitman,  George  (2013)  „The  neo-normative  turn  in  theorising  the  EU's
international  presence“,  Cooperation and  Conflict,  Vol.  48(2):171-193;  Hyde-Price,  Adrian (2006)
„‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique“, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol 13(2):217-234
74 Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009:794
75 Ibid., p 797
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governments triggered by increasing EU integration.
The main  element  that  differentiates  a  network mode of  external  governance
from a hierarchical one, is the formal equality of actors, in spite the practical possibility
of power asymmetries. Networks are formed around a mutual voluntary agreement, and
instead  of  producing  restrictive  instruments,  they  stipulate  procedural  modes  of
interaction as a result of negotiations, where rules are rather coordinated than top-down
implemented. Emphasising interaction and deliberation, network governance leaves its
parties more room for manoeuvre than the hierarchical mode does. EEA, ENP and EU-
Swiss relations are great examples of how network mode of EU external governance
takes place in practice.76
As opposed to the previously described network coordination and hierarchical
implementation,  the  market  mode  is  based  on  competition  between  formally
autonomous  actors.  In  political  science,  competition  is  sometimes  seen  as  an
institutionalised form of political market interaction and Lavenex and Schimmelfennig
see  this  as  a  third  basic  mode  of  external  governance.  The  principle  of  mutual
recognition in the EU Single Market application and its extension to the EEA is one of
the examples of the market mode of external governance in the EU's case. Even in the
absence of mutual recognition, EU presence in third countries can lead to indirect rule
adaptation in case their mutual interdependence is high, namely between markets.77
Lavenex also points out a possible negative scenario that external governance can
pertain,  especially  in  a  network  mode,  predicting  that  in  the  long run,  partnerships
negotiated  with  each  country  in  selected  policy  fields  may  result  in  patterns  of
differentiated integration. Then again, if the model would be effective, it would “result
in a wider Europe not so much in terms of common institutions but more in terms of a
'security community'”78.
 Empirical  studies  on  EU  external  governance  have  focused  testing  the
effectiveness of EU rule transfer in the case of CEE countries' pre-accession or single
76 Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009:797-799
77 Ibid.
78 Lavenex, 2004:694
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ENP countries79 and good governance promotion in individual countries80. Later works
have  explored  the  limits  of  EU external  governance81 and  analysed  its  presence  in
different policy fields, such as migration, visa policy82, global environmental policy or
climate change83. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig continued to develop their approach to
EU external governance84 and in 2011, they published a collection of previous articles in
a book issued by Journal of European Public Policy Series85 which unfortunately was
not  publicly  accessible  for  the  author  of  this  thesis.  Based  on  previous  CEE  pre-
accession cases,  they also studied different governance modes that might lead to an
effective EU rule transfer to outside states.
2.3. Theoretical expectations: conditions for an effective external governance
The EU's ability to influence democratic change in third countries depends on a number
of aspects where Lavenex, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier discuss a few of them that
might circumscribe the effectiveness of EU external governance. The author gathered
claims from literature and concluded a list of rules that condition the effectiveness of
external policy in the following Table 2.
79 For example, Bosse, Giselle, Korosteleva-Polglase, Elena (2009) „Changing Belarus?: The Limits of
EU Governance in Eastern Europe and the Promise of Partnership“, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.
44(2):143–165; Dimitrova,  Antoaneta,  Dragneva,  Rilka (2009) „Constraining external  governance:
interdependence with Russia and the CIS as limits to the EU's rule transfer in the Ukraine“, Journal of
European Public Policy, Vol 16(6):853-872
80 For example, Baltag, Doriana, Romanyshyn, Julian (2011) „EU external governance: successful good
governance promotion on Moldova and Ukraine?“, Working Paper FG2, 2011/2, April, SWP Berlin; 
81 For  example,  Wunderlich,  Daniel  (2012)  „The  limits  of  external  governance:  implementing  EU
external migration policy“, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol 19(9):1414-1433
82 For example, Kadlubovich, Aliona (2013) „Visa Policy as an Instrument of EU External Governance?
The Case of Belarus“, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, Institute for European Integration, Study Paper No
1/14
83 For example, Pavese, Carolina B., Torney,  Diarmuid (2012) „The contribution of the European Union
to global climate change governance: explaining the conditions for EU actorness“, Revista Brasileira
de Política Internacional, Vol 55, no.spe, Brasília
84 For  example,  Freyburg,  Tina,  et  al.  (2009)  „EU  promotion  of  democratic  governance  in  the
neighbourhood“, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol 16(6):916-934
85 See Lavenex, Sandra, Schimmelfennig, Frank (2011) „EU External Governance: Projecting EU Rules
beyond Membership“, Journal of European Public Policy Series
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Table 2. Conditions for an effective external governance86
Conditions Rules (examples from the literature) Category ofresearch
Implementation
measures
Rules that are transferred through social learning or 
lesson-drawing are much less contested domestically.
External incentives and bargaining is more likely to 
cause domestic resistance and poor implementation.
Internal
structural
factors
in the EU
Consistency of EU
offer
Cost-benefit calculations of target governments depend 
on the consistency of conditionality.
Compliance within the
EU and with
international rules
The more an EU rule is supported and complied with 
within the EU and the more it is in line with 
international rules beyond the EU, the more likely third 
countries will accept it.
International structure
of power
Effectiveness of EU external governance varies with 
international structures of power (power-based 
explanation)
International
influence
Possibility of
alternatives
External governance and conditionality can only be 
effective when there is no credible alternative to EU 
integration
Interdependence
between EU and third
countries
Effectiveness of EU external governance varies with 
interdependence between the EU and third countries. If 
mutual interdependence is high, external governance 
can be more effective. (power-based explanation)
Domestic structures
and political regime of
third countries
Domestic structures of third countries may condition the
mode and effectiveness of external governance.
Democracy promotion, through political conditionality, 
is likely to be effective only in at least partly 
democratised countries with lower domestic adjustment 
costs.
Domestic
factors
in partner
countries
Perceived legitimacy
of EU rules
Perceived legitimacy of EU rules is a prerequisite for 
selecting them as the basis of cooperation in EU third-
country relations.
If EU rules are seen as legitimate, they are more likely 
accepted.
Compatibility with
domestic institutions
Effectiveness is driven by its compatibility with 
domestic institutions. Domestically compatible EU rule 
is more likely accepted.
(domestic structure explanation)
86 Author's own compilation, based on Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier,
2004 and Lavenex, 2004
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According  to  theory,  transferring  rules  through  social  learning  or  lesson-drawing  is
much less domestically contested in third countries than it would via external incentives
and bargaining model87. Implementation measures in EU conditionality therefore make
up the first important criteria for rule transfer, where the rules themselves are important
as well. “the more an EU rule is supported and complied with within the EU and the
more it is in line with international rules beyond the EU, the more likely third countries
will accept it as a basis of negotiation, adopt it and apply it”88 which is concluded as the
third effectiveness condition (see Table 2, pp 23).
In order to achieve this compliance, the EU has to be consistent in what they
offer.  The  “credibility  [of  conditionality]  depends  on  the  consistency  of  an
organisation's  allocation  of  rewards”89,  which  is  an  important  factor  influencing  the
cost-benefit calculations of target governments (see Table 2, pp  23). The reforms that
are required to be undertaken to comply with EU rules will imply a series of costs for
target countries, especially for authoritarian governments in ENP countries. In order for
third  countries  to  take  on  the  costly  reform  process,  the  advantages  of  credible
preferential  trade  relations  will  have  to  exceed  these  costs90.  Now,  if  there  were  a
conflict about the offer, doubts in an EU reward or issues with EU internal consensus,
target countries would receive inconsistent signals and might be confused or tempted to
manipulate  the  situation  in  their  advantage91.  Either  way,  it  would  result  in  poor
implementation.
Since external governance is rather context-dependent, an important precondition
for its effectiveness lies in international context. Effectiveness varies with international
structure of power and interdependence between the EU and third countries. Moreover,
the possibility or absence of competition – conditionality can only be effective in case
there is no credible alternative to EU integration92 (see Table 2, pp 23).
Domestic cost of rule adoption in third countries is decisive in determining the
success of EU external governance, whereas the cost is seen being related to domestic
87 Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2004:682
88 Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009:802
89 Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2004:674
90 Mocanu, 2010:45
91 Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2004:674
92 Ibid.
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political regime of third countries (see Table 2, pp  23).  For example, in authoritarian
regimes and countries with a lower level of economic and social development, transition
to democracy and adoption of EU rules can be costly93. Conforming to path dependence
theory, once a country has started down an authoritarian track, the costs of reversal for
democratic developments are high. While analysing CEE countries' EU pre-accession
conditionality,  Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier found that authoritarian governments
sometimes “turned down the offer of membership rather than accept the political power
costs of adopting liberal democratic rules”94. Reform-minded governments in at least
partly democratised countries with lower domestic adjustment costs are therefore more
likely to adopt the rules95. In addition to political regime and domestic adjustment costs,
effectiveness is also driven by the perceived legitimacy of EU rules in these countries
and the compatibility of EU rules with their institutions (see Table 2, pp 23).
For  structuring  theoretical  expectations  and  empirical  research,  the  author
divided  these  nine  theoretical  conditions  between  three  observable  categories  of
research. Implementation measures, the consistency of EU offer and the compliance of
rules within the EU would be viewed as internal structural problems of the EU and the
policy itself;  international  structures of power,  possibility of alternatives and mutual
interdependence would be considered as international influence; and domestic structures
and political regime, the perceived legitimacy of EU rules and their compatibility with
domestic institutions would be summed up as domestic factors in partner countries (see
Table 2,  pp 23). In terms of compliance, literature review in the next part of the thesis
will be sorted according to the same categories of research.
93 Emerson, Michael, Noutcheva, Gergana, Popescu, Nicu (2007) „European Neighbourhood Policy two
years on: Time indeed for an 'ENP plus'“, Centre for European Policy Studies, Policy brief No 126,
March 2007:6
94 Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2004:671
95 Ibid., p 678; Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009:807
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3. Problems in European Neighbourhood Policy implementation
3.1. Accomplishments and state of play96
According to  European Commission's  annual  ENP report  from March 2014,  crucial
political and economic reforms were implemented in several countries while democratic
reforms and economic recovery achieved in previous years were threatened by national
and  regional  security  challenges,  political  instability  and  difficult  socio-economic
conditions in others97. The following state of play review brings up accomplishments of
the policy and highlights the current topical issues across the neighbourhood.
From the EU's self-reflection, ENP has been viewed as „part of a wider effort to
make the EU's foreign policy – criticised for being inconsistent and mainly reactive –
more coherent“98. In fact, uniting member states under a common policy is said to be the
main positive outcome of the ENP, which sadly is true. Compared to other EU external
policies like relations to Russia, US or Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),
ENP is where EU countries tend to have the least differences of opinion.
Similar aspiration to coherence, equality and a harmonised EU offer is sometimes
seen as a positive quality of ENP structure as well99. EU as a non-discriminating entity
respecting equality among democratic values, aims to maintain the same approach in the
ENP framework by treating  all  16  partners  under  the  same conditions  and offering
similar benefits in return for similar reforms.  “Although this aspiration to equality is
anchored in the Treaty on European Union, an aspiration it remains”100 and the next
chapter  about  ENP's  internal  problems  will  reveal  how  offering  equal  benefits  for
different partners has, on the contrary, obstructed the effectiveness of the policy.
In the past few years, Eastern neighbourhood, with the exception of Moldova and
96 This chapter includes some references to media as examples about recent developments, however,
none of them are quoted or used as a source of arguments for answering the research questions.
97 European  Commission  (2014a)  „Neighbourhood  at  the  crossroads  –  taking  stock  of  a  year  of
challenges“, Annual country reports, Press release, 27.03.2014:1
98 Comelli, 2004:98
99 Fischer, Sabine, Lannon, Erwan (2011) „The ENP Strategic Review: The EU and its Neighbourhood
at a Crossroads“, European Union Institute for Security Studies:2
100Biscop, Sven (2013) „Europe and the world or snow white and the seven fallacies“, Egmont paper
61:17
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Georgia, has become even more authoritarian101.  A  Partnership  and  Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) with Belarus remains frozen since 1997 with still no AP in place for
over ten years. In fact,  Belarus might even be the most problematic EaP partner: the
country  has  on  several  occasions  been  described  as  being  the  last  dictatorship  in
Europe102. Political situation in the country faces some serious issues regarding electoral
standards  in  presidential  elections  (2010),  crackdowns  on  civil  society,  independent
media,  political  prisoners and opposition,  respect  for  human rights,  rule  of law and
democratic principles103. This poses if not a threat then at least a serious challenge to
ENP performance as well, not to mention the EU's foreign policy in general.
In the Southern neighbourhood, the main interest of ruling elites tend to be more
interested  in  staying  in  power  which generally  undermines democratic political
progress104,  with the exception of Morocco where historically the King has been the
driving force towards respecting women's rights or multi-party system105. In most cases,
three overlapping policies for the Mediterranean106 have caused its focus to be indistinct,
whereas the UfM has “created even greater political expectations than the ENP”107. In
addition to (or as a result of) non-democratic,  repressive  or  authoritarian political
regimes, Mediterranean countries have experienced comprehensive domestic struggles
within  the  past  five years,  especially in  2011 and 2012 with Arab Spring, Tunisian
revolution, instability, protests or uprisings in Syria, Egypt or Libya.
The year 2013 was a turning point for ENP. As Popescu predicted in September –
before the Vilnius summit –, “even though the Union's most important projects of the
last decade in the Eastern neighbourhood are nearing completion, things might still get
side-tracked”108 and they did.  Threats  over the longest running conflict  in  the South
101Fischer, Lannon, 2011:2
102For example, Bosse, Giselle (2012) „A partnership with Dictatorship: Explaining the Paradigm Shift
in European Union Policy towards Belarus“, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 50(3):367-384
103European  Commission  (2014b)  „ENP Package  –  Belarus“,  Memo  14/222,  Brussels,  27.03.2014;
EEAS website: eeas.europa.eu/belarus
104Fischer, Lannon, 2011
105Storm, Lise (2007) „Democratization in Morocco: The political elite and struggles for power in the
post-independence state“, Routledge
106Cardwell,  Paul James (2010) „EuroMed, European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the
Mediterranean: Overlapping Policy Frames in the EU's Governance of the Mediterranean“, Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol 49(2):219-241
107Fischer, Lannon, 2011:2
108Popescu,  Nicu  (2013)  “Keeping  the  Eastern  Partnership  on  track”,  European  Union  Institute  for
Security Studies, Alerts No 29:2
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Caucasus in Nagorno-Karabakh led to Armenia announcing a wish to join the Russian-
led  Customs  Union  in  September  –  two  months  after  finalising  three-year  DCFTA
negotiations which will not be signed now. The Vilnius summit in November turned into
what  some might  say a fiasco109 when signing AA with Ukraine was called off  last
minute and followed by a sequence civil  protests (“Euromaidan”) and a momentous
change  in  Crimea.  By  now,  the  media  has  started  drawing  parallels  to  breakaway
territories in other post-soviet EaP countries, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia in
Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova110.
Whether it was the influence of economic crisis in Europe, aftermath of regional
conflicts or national issues, some might even say they are disappointed in ENP and that
EaP is on the verge of a failure111. To find reasons for why the policy has not been as
successful  as  hoped,  the  following  three  sub-chapters  explore  problems  that  have
affected ENP implementation in three fields of research: internal structural problems in
the  EU,  international  influence  and  Russian  foreign  policy  in  the  common
neighbourhood, and domestic factors in partner countries. Table 3 at the end of part
three sums up the main problems under the same categorisation (see Table 3, pp 38).
3.2. Internal structural problems in the European Union
The largest problem in ENP structure lies in the conditionality model (see Table 3, pp
38). Either  due  to  the  absence  of  membership  prospect  or  the  fact  that  containing
accession aspirations would be largely impractical112, incentives have turned out to be
less productive than expected. Although unintended, it has had negative consequences
and resulted in unwillingness to conduct reforms, especially in the East where the „lack
of a membership perspective curbed the enthusiasm of EU-oriented governments“113.
Between the  realms of  EU pre-accession and external  relations,  the  commitment  of
109See Rettman, Andrew (2013) „EU and Ukraine: What went wrong?“, EUObserver, 25.11.13
110For example, Toal, Gerard, O’Loughlin, John (2014) „How people in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and
Transnistria  feel  about  annexation  by  Russia“,  Washington  Post,  20.03.2014;  Connelly,  Andrew
(2014) „Transnistria: Europe's other Crimea“, Al Jazeera, 14.03.2014
111For example, Wiśniewski, 2013; Kirchherr, 2012; Babayan, 2011
112Borell et al., 2012:4
113Fischer, Lannon, 2011:2
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partner  countries  on  the  “difficult  and  demanding  path  of  transition  towards
democracy”114 is debatable. The existence of a real commitment as well as the sincerity
of EU in affirming conditionality has been put to question by many authors115.
In  ENP conditionality,  the  EU has  been reluctant  to  deliver116,  meaning,  the
“reinforcement  by  reward”  model  concedes  the  possibility  of  being  left  without  a
reward,  albeit  meeting  the  requirements  (see  Table  3,  pp  38).  Increasing  market
integration is what partner countries would benefit the most of, but the EU has been
hesitant to take further steps on economic integration, especially during the Eurocrisis.
It  could be that  the so-called enlargement  fatigue has weakened the already limited
commitment of EU member states to support their neighbours117. Regardless, in order to
be resultant, conditionality model has to be supported by the consistency of EU offer
and delivering benefits, either financial assistance or market access in order to keep the
partners motivated.  At the end of the day, “the victory or breakdown of conditionality
depends on both, the commitment of ENP partners, but most of all, on the EU's capacity
to replace traditional incentive of accession with a proper alternative”118.
If  the  carrot  of  enlargement  is  not  available,  ENP partner  countries  need  an
equally alluring endgame, which brings up the second largest  problem – the  issue of
motivation (see Table 3, pp 38). Instead of creating some sort of intermediate forms of
partial  membership,  a valid  motivation  package  with  a  clear  result  is  what  these
countries probably need the most., but so far, it has been unclear what is the outcome,
endgame,  the  finalité of  ENP.  In  ENP  framework,  the  reward  seems  to  be  the
“possibility to benefit from 'privileged relations' with the Union, by an increased access
to the EU internal market”119. The negotiated agreements (AAs or DCFTAs) might as
well be the final stage of the policy, resulting in an association area or advanced status.
On a side note, a precedent might be taking place with Ukraine. There have been
occasionally prevailing  opinions  within  some EU member  states  (Poland,  Slovakia,
Hungary,  and the  Baltic  states)  that  the  EU should  offer  Ukraine  the  possibility of
114European Commission, 2014a:1
115For example, Zaiotti, Ruben (2007) „Of Friends and Fences: Europe’s Neighbourhood Policy and the
‘Gated Community Syndrome’“, Journal of European Integration, Vol 29(2):143-162
116Fischer, Lannon, 2011:2
117Zaiotti, 2007:158
118Mocanu, 2010:42
119Ibid., p 44
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eventual  EU  membership120.  In  February  2014,  the  Council  of  the  EU  publicly
expressed that the association and free trade agreement is  not the final goal in EU-
Ukraine cooperation121. Although a formal statement on Ukraine's accession would have
to be made where each member state has a right to veto, this was the first time EU
leaders have indicated that Ukraine might one day join the EU. Even if it is not barely a
diplomatic signal, offering membership to selected ENP partners – either just Ukraine or
potentially all six EaP countries – could create motivation issues in the Mediterranean.
Third and a rather fundamental error in the policy's structure is its one-size fits-
all structure with a group of heterogeneous countries in a large geopolitical area (see
Table 3, pp 38). It is a rather awkward combination, and not just because of economic
and social diversity of these countries, but the fact that countries in Eastern Europe are
to a some extent seen as potential EU members, while for Mediterranean partners, a
membership perspective is very unlikely already on geographical stipulations122. It has
been proposed that the Mediterranean was included in the ENP framework barely to
counterbalance EU's  focus between the East  and South123,  however,  possible  hidden
agenda or political motives for this combination are subject to debate.
While Southern  neighbours  were  optimistic  in  view  of  consolidating  their
relations with the EU and Balkan countries were satisfied being left out, as a sign of
possible  EU accession prospect124,  the „Eastern neighbours did not appreciate being
lumped together with the Union’s southern partners“125 and hoped for deeper integration
via  EaP126.  Harmonised  approach  and  aspiration  for  equality  may  be  seen  as  an
accomplishment from the EU's self-reflection perspective, but each country has their
own starting position, development level, economic situation, political regime, ethnic
composition, traditions, national issues, aspirations, relations to Russia and their own
vision upon relations to EU.
120Ünal  Eriş,  Özgür,  Öner,  Selcen  (2013)  „An  Evaluation  of  the  Transformative  Power  of  EU
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policies: The Cases of Turkey and Ukraine“, Spectrum: Journal of
Global Studies, Vol 5(1):68
121Council of the European Union (2014) „Council conclusions on Ukraine“, Foreign Affairs Council
meeting, Brussels, 10.02.2014, page 2, point 5
122TEU Articles 2, 49
123Smith, Karen E. (2005a), „The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy“, International Affairs,
Vol 81(4):758
124Mocanu, 2010:46
125Fischer, Lannon, 2011:2
126Solonenko, Iryna, Ursu, Viorel (2013) „Neighbourhood watch“, 1 November 2013, openDemocracy
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For example, “Armenia saw its inclusion in the EaP as (…) a way of resolving
ongoing  problems with  its  neighbours”127 Turkey and  Azerbaijan,  whereas  Morocco
hoped for gradual integration of its energy market into the EU market128 and Azerbaijan
had  high  expectations  on  establishing  a  dialogue  on  Nagorno-Karabakh  and  create
conditions for freer  travel  of its  citizens  to the EU129.  Even geographical  distinction
between South and East seems inappropriate, owing to differences in reform aptitude
and  interest  in  European  integration  in  these  countries130 with  varying  domestic
challenges. All in all, the generalization of the ENP has created a one-size fits-all policy
inappropriate to dealing with the specificities of all 16 countries131.
Fourth, regarding the combination of countries, ENP is struggling to meet two
sometimes conflicting objectives (see Table 3, pp 38): on one hand, it seeks to establish
a common security policy with its neighbours, but on the other, it aims to manage these
countries' accession aspirations – be them real, perceived or potential132. Browning and
Joenniemi, who analyse ENP via collected geostrategies, see this dual purpose being a
contradiction in  itself:  horizontal  integration does  not  guarantee a  greater  protection
from, or resistance to, external harm. Thus, they argue that the policy is unable to solve
the EU's cross-border security concerns, saying “it will fail to extricate the EU from a
logic that links external security with the need for further integration of outsiders“133. In
addition, a mutually beneficial ENP aims to serve two interests at once.
The fifth internal structural problem regards EU inconsistency and self-interest
when applying conditionality in ENP partner countries (see Table 3, pp 38). The fact
that  the  EU has  started  negotiating  AAs –  supposed to  be  signed  with  functioning
electoral democracies – with Armenia or other South Caucasus countries that do not
meet  this  political  condition,  shows  EU  inconsistency  in  conditionality  application,
127Babayan, 2011:1
128Carafa,  Luigi,  Korhonen,  Kaisa  (2008)  „European  Neighbourhood  Policy:  A  Case  Study  of
MoroccoEuropean  Neighbourhood  Policy:  A Case  Study  of  Morocco“,  Social  Science  Research
Network, SSRN Electronic Working Paper Series, 27.04.2008:7
129Poptchev, Peter (2013) „The Security Policy-Energy Nexus“, p 72; in Lyutskanov, Emil, Alieva, Leila,
Serafimova,  Mila  (2013)  „Energy  Securiy  in  the  Wider  Black  Sea  Area  –  National  and  Allied
Approaches“, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol
110
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which ultimately reduces its credibility and future bargaining power134. The EU has even
been accused of having double standards when pursuing relations with authoritarian
regimes under ENP normative framework135. Moreover, the partnership means and goals
were largely shaped by donor countries' vision, as opposed to partner countries' needs.
In  some  cases,  the  EU  prioritises  its  economic  and  energy  interests  over
democratic  conditionality.  For  example,  in  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  or  Morocco,
developing energy sector is of high importance, since the EU is interested in advancing
the country's role in EU energy security, therefore, political issues are in comparison a
low priority136. In Lebanon's case, ENP reflects European understanding of what has to
be changed in their migration policy, without taking into account the country's political
instability  or  the  migration  challenges  that  Lebanon is  facing137.  The  EU's  security-
centred approach to migration is more aimed to serve the EU's interests with regard to
fight against irregular migration, instead of supporting partner countries in developing a
coherent migration policy, adequate enough to address their own migration problems,
such as emigration or brain drain in Georgia138.
On that note, in EU discourse, ENP is often praised as a good governance project
that enables countries to become democratic, modern and economically competitive.
Maintaining stability in cross-border countries and avoiding large social cleavages with
the EU can certainly be helpful for target countries,  while being aimed at controlling
cross-border movements, restraining illegal migration, combating organised crime and
human trafficking, ENP's intention to prevent any kind of danger,  violence, crisis or
instabilities from spilling over into the EU member states139 is rather driven by EU self-
interest than partner countries' needs.
With  regard  to  the  idea  of  Europeanisation,  it  has  been argued that  with  the
excuse of ENP, the EU is imposing European or Western values and standards on third
134Babayan, 2011:2
135Nasieniak, Magdalena, Depo, Bogdana (2013) „Conditionality and election performance within the
framework  of  the European Neighbourhood Policy.  The Case of  the  2012 and 2013 Elections in
Armenia, Georgia und Ukraine“, IEP Policy Papers on Eastern Europe and Central Asia, No 3, p 6
136Carafa, Korhonen, 2008:1,7
137Sensenig-Dabbous, El-Hindy, Hourani 2013:56; in Benedek, et al., 2013
138Gabrichidz, Gaga, Kobakhidze, Irakli (2013) Case study: Georgia, p 46; in Benedek, Wolfgang, et al.
(2013) „Effect of migration policies on human rights in the European neigbourhood“, Study, Policy
Department DG External Policies, Brussels
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countries. The EU's patronising approach and focus on EU values can be concluded as
the sixth internal structural problem (see Table 3, pp 38). The idea of ENP is to endorse
values that are respected in the EU, such as peace, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule
of law, good governance, respect for human rights and human dignity, tolerance, justice,
civil freedoms, non-discrimination and market economy.  In spite of declaring ENP as
being based on shared values, they are actually rather unilateral. Some countries do not
even share the history of observing this kind of principles, most troublesome of them
being human rights and democracy140 in authoritarian traditionally Islamic countries.
The seventh internal problem lies in the logic of EU budget which determines
how the EU can distribute financial support from the ENPI141 (see Table 3, pp 38). ENP
stands  on  an  individual  budget  line  that  in  itself  is  divided  into  East  and  South
measures.  Not  only do these  measures  have to  compete for  one amount  of  budget,
moreover, member states have various preferences when it comes to improving their
neighbourhood, in terms of where the vast majority of financing should be channelled.
Some would prefer to develop infrastructure in Jordan, promote economic development
in Tunisia or support judiciary independence in Lebanon, others would invest in Israel's
industry, accelerate constitutional reforms in Morocco or assist civil society in Algeria.
Some researchers are even on the opinion that the small budget was the main concern
that caused ENP to be ineffective142.
Since  these  priorities  in  assistance  distribution  are  largely  assembled  by EU
member states'  historical preferences, national interests and interdependence between
certain countries, the eighth EU internal problem of member states' national priorities
comes up (see Table 3, pp 38). Historically, France, United Kingdom and Italy have
been interested in resuming mutually favourable developments in North Africa – in their
former  colonies  –,  whereas  the  former  Eastern  block  is  looking  forward  to  greater
integration with Ukraine, Moldova and South Caucasus. In a way, ENP allows member
states to “promote their own national priorities at the expense of regional dialogue”143
140Ibid., p 86
141European  Neighborhood  and  Partnership  Instrument  –  the  financial  instrument  for  ENP (former
TACIS and MEDA programmes) covering 16 ENP partner countries and Russia, to be replaced by
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) for 2014-2020
142Kirchherr, 2012
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which caused the EU's attention to sway between its Eastern and Southern neighbours.
Therefore, ENP's overall focus has been disturbed. When conflicts emerged in
the Arab world in 2011, EU's attention was on the South; in 2013 before the Vilnius
summit  and during Lithuanian EU presidency, the focus was on the East;  by spring
2014, international community's grave concern is about Ukraine and Russia. On top of
that,  each  Council  presidency  adds  periods  of  volatility,  such  as  Lithuanian  EU
presidency in 2013 with an increased focus on EaP144. Subsequently, ENP no longer has
a  much  needed  clearly  defined  focus  which  adds  to  the  list  of  internal  structural
problems. Instead, it has changed whenever the context does, making EU's attention not
only to be dependant on its internal developments but on international influence as well.
3.3. International influence and Russian foreign policy
As no external policy is immune to international or regional developments, neither is
ENP. Although Russia's role may be marginal in the Mediterranean, EaP includes six
post-communist countries where Russia has an undeniably heavy presence145 (see Table
3, pp 38). They would prefer these countries to join or at least strengthen cooperation
with the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan rather than engage with the
West. Yerevan already is a close military ally of Moscow, moreover, Armenia's recent
defence  agreement  extended  Russia's  military  base  lease  until  2044,  which  further
increases Russian influence and military pre-eminence in the region146. With a vision to
expand the Customs Union to a more large-scale Eurasian Union, Russia has created a
counter-offer to EU association – an alternative for ENP target countries.
However, Russian foreign politics, diplomacy and means for achieving that have
been widely criticised. With “a long track record of using pseudo technical barriers to
trade as instruments of political pressure”147, every now and then, Russia tends to use
144Lithuanian  EU  Presidency  website:  www.eu2013.lt/en/news/pressreleases/focus-of-lithuanian-
presidency-in-researchstrengthening-ties-with-eastern-partnership-countries
145Huff, Ariella (2011) „The role of EU defence policy in the Eastern neighbourhood“, European Union
Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper, 91, May 2011:15
146Babayan, 2011:4
147Emerson,  Michael,  Kostanyan,  Hrant  (2013)  „Putin's  grand  design  to  destroy  the  EU's  Eastern
Partnership  and  replace  it  with  a  disastrous  neighbourhood  policy  of  his  own“,  The  Centre  for
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hard  power,  threats,  energy supplies  and  trade  restrictions  as  means  of  coercion  to
protect  its  interests  in  the  region148. For  example,  they  banned Moldovan wine and
Ukrainian chocolate imports in 2013149 when the two countries were about to finalise
EU AAs150. In case of breakaway territories in its near abroad, Russia's tactic has been to
use separatist tensions in order to justify political interference which has led to critical
conclusions  on  Russia “playing  19th century  zero-sum  games  of  geopolitical
competition”151.
EU soft power might not be enough to counterbalance Russian economic and
military pre-eminence and hard power in their shared neighbourhood. Although the EU
model of liberal democracy and open market economy might be more attractive for the
ENP countries, Russian trade barriers and gas disputes have a greater immediate impact
on their economic situation. Plus, “a one-year limbo between initialling and signing the
[association] agreements puts the countries in a rather vulnerable position since, until
the signature is in place, external opponents of this process have ample incentives and
time to try a last-minute attempt to derail the process just before finishing line”152 as
seen in case of Ukraine. At this point of regional competition, the EU can not achieve
ENP goals through EU soft power.
When aspiring for greater ENP effectiveness in the East, one has to consider how
Russia perceives the EU and EaP specifically. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov
points out that from their point of view, EaP is designed to bind the “focus states tightly
to  itself  [the  EU],  shutting  down  the  possibility  of  cooperation  with  Russia”153. A
diplomatic solution in this situation would be holding multilateral talks with all three
groups of stakeholders – the EU, EaP countries and Russia154 – about the effect and
consequences of AAs on all parties.
When it comes to EU-Russia relations, there is no consensus among EU member
148See  Russia  Today  (2014)  „Putin:  Deploying  military  force  is  last  resort,  but  we  reserve  right“,
04.03.2014; BBC News (2013) „Analysis: Russia's carrot-and-stick battle for Ukraine“, 17.12.2013
149See Tanas, Alexander, Balmforth, Richard, Liffey, Kevin (2013) „Russia, unhappy with Moldova's EU
drive, bans its wine and spirits“, Reuters, 10.09.2013; Weir, Fred (2013) „Russia sends a bitter trade
message to Ukraine – with chocolate“, The Christian Science Monitor, 20.08.2013
150Emerson, Michael (2014) „Countdown to the Vilnius Summit: The EU's trade relations with Moldova
and the South Caucasus“, Workshop report, Policy Department DG External Policies, Brussels:11
151Emerson, Kostanyan, 2013:4
152Popescu, 2013:2
153Lavrov, Sergei (2014) „It's not Russia that is destabilising Ukraine“, The Guardian, 07.04.2014
154Wiśniewski, 2013:3
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states on how to engage with Russia or whether they should cooperate in stabilising
shared neighbourhood. Although the current Ukrainian case has led to freezing EU-
Russia  visa-liberalisation  talks  and  preparing  for  economic  sanctions,  most  West
Europeans  do  not  seem  to  share  the  concerns  of  the  Baltic  states  or  Poland155.
Historically,  they  have  been  more  reluctant  to  enhancing  this  partnership,  whereas
Germany, Italy and France have traditionally favoured closer links with Russia. There is
a divide between „whether to preserve relations with Moscow by minimising the EU's
role  in  the  Eastern  region,  or  to  deepen  relations  with  the  Eastern  neighbourhood
countries even at the risk of antagonising Russia“156. The focus of EU therefore remains
uncoordinated and distracted, leaving Russia a rather favourable position for strategic
manoeuvres  in  politically  unsettled  countries  which  makes  them an  easy  target  for
international influence.
3.4. Domestic factors in partner countries
Since “willingness to reform cannot be imposed from outside”157, ENP success relies on
attitudes  in  partner  countries,  namely  in  their  governments,  political  situation  and
national interests (see Table 3, pp 38).  So far, governments in both regions have been
politically  unsettled:   in  the  East,  “domestic  political  volatility  is  accompanied  by
geopolitical  volatility,  with  the  countries'  strategic  future  –  not  just  economic
governability  –  being  at  stake”158,  in  the  South,  the  process  of  modernisation  and
transition has in some cases, such as Egypt, created political polarisation. In an unstable
situation  like  this,  it  has  been  challenging  to  establish  a  steady  path  towards
democratisation and further integration with the EU.
Regarding fields  in  which  they cooperate,  some partners  might  not  share  the
same interests as the EU does and might not even be that fond of establishing a political
partnership. For instance, Belarus is rather disintegrated in EaP and has been reluctant to
sign up to what the EU has to offer and  “Azerbaijan has a strong energy partnership
155See Economist (2014) „Echoes of the Sudetenland. The Baltics look to NATO for protection“, The
Economist, Print edition, 29.03.2014
156Huff, 2011:15
157European Commission, 2014a:1
158Popescu, 2013:1
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with the EU, but is rather uninterested in political reforms”159,  harmonisation with EU
values or democratisation as such. Armenia has been aspiring for economic partnership
with Europe, but military partnership with Russia. In fact, the president of Armenia sees
the partnership with Russia natural, given Armenia's large diaspora in Russia and its
dependence  on  Russia  to  guarantee  security,  while  “Russian  capital  dominates
Armenian telecommunications, electricity networks, banking and gas distribution”160.
Besides, none of the 16 countries are even considered to be democratic nor free,
except Israel161 (see Table 3, pp 38). Despite the somewhat positive aftermath of Orange
revolution in Ukraine, Rose revolution in Georgia or Arab spring ten years later, that
looked promising  in  terms  of  democratic  developments  in  their  societies,  existing
regimes  proved  to  be  entrenched.  In  supporting  democratic  developments  in  these
countries, the Union has been reluctant to offer financial support to political opponents
of authoritarian regimes162.
Relationships with ENP partners are “vulnerable to the vicissitudes of political
events on the ground”163. At the same time, EU efforts in conflict resolution have been
marginal, mainly diplomatic and not leading to visible positive results. For example, the
EU,  while  deepening its  civil  cooperation with Armenia,  has  done little  to ease the
country's vulnerable geopolitical situation164. In fact, both, Armenia and Azerbaijan were
hoping for a great EU contribution to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, since it
poses a  security threat  to EU borders as well,  yet,  since the EU has no perceptible
influence over Azerbaijan, their strategy towards conflict resolution has turned out to be
rather reactive than than proactive165. These issues limit the effectiveness of ENP and
affect the perception of EU in these countries which appears to be related to the EU's
role in addressing regional and national problems.
159Ibid., p 2
160Babayan, 2011:2; Emerson, Kostanyan, 2013:1
161According to Freedm House's Freedom in the World 2013 index, Israel is the only one of the 16 ENP
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Table 3. Problems in ENP implementation166
Internal structural problems
in the EU
International
influence
Domestic factors
in partner countries
Conditionality, external incentives,
EU reluctant to deliver
Regional 
competition and 
possible alternatives
(i.e. Customs Union)
Political unsettlement and 
volatility
Motivation issues, finalité Political will and interests of target governments
Inappropriate one-size fits-all structure 
to cover 16 countries
Lack of democracy, mainly 
authoritarian regimes
Two sometimes conflicting objectives 
(common security and integration vs. 
managing accession aspirations)
Events and conflicts on the 
ground, individual national 
problems
Inconsistency in conditionality 
application, EU self-interest
Russian foreign 
policy and presence 
in the common 
neighbourhood
(East dimension)
Perception of EU/ENP
(often related to how national 
problems are addressed)Donor countries' vision, Western values
Logic of EU budget
EU values not always shared 
by target countries*No consensus, MS historical preferences
(interdependence)
No focus, attention sways between
East and South
Countries' own vision upon 
relations to the EU*
* Although these issues came up while discussing internal structural problems in the European Union
under chapter 3.1., they account for domestic factors in partner countries.
In sum, the largest problem in the ENP structure lies in the conditionality model that
raises the issue of motivation: in the absence of membership perspective, the EU has not
been  able  to  provide  a  sufficiently  attractive  model  of  cooperation  to  stimulate
democratic reforms. Focusing on EU's borders as a whole has created a one-size fits-all
policy, inappropriate to dealing with each country's individual problems. So far, none of
the bilateral dialogues between the EU and its Eastern partners are immune to Russian
foreign politics, as seen in cases of military cooperation with Armenia, Crimea and gas
disputes in Ukraine, or banning Moldavian wine imports in 2012. Political regime and
the will of governments in target countries has become the most widespread hindrance
to modernisation and reform, according to almost all authors (see Table 3).
166Author's own compilation, based on arguments gathered from literature reviewed throughout chapter
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4. Problems in comparison with external governance model
4.1. Analysis of European Neighbourhood Policy's effectiveness
When assessing ENP implementation, it  is important to consider that the policy was
created as one of the latest components of the EU external relations, into a rather narrow
niche  between  the  global  ambitions  of  foreign  and  security  policy  and  regional
aspirations of enlargement policy.  The following analysis helps to solve the research
problem by narrowing down key aspects that the policy's effectiveness depends on and
where improvement is needed. The analysis in this part of the thesis does not only bring
out the similarities and differences between theory and practice, but also tests whether
the  effectiveness  conditions  and  ENP problems  can  be  rationalised  with  empirical
evidence and facts or not.
 The following Table 4 illustrates how well are theoretical conditions and rules
met in ENP practice.  There are problems in each category of research that have had
negative effect on ENP performance: the conditions where this is the most evident, are
highlighted in bold and each condition's effect on ENP's performance in the last column
is indicated in brackets (see Table 4). For a comprehensive examination and recalling
what  the  theoretical  expectations  had  claimed,  the  author  suggests  simultaneously
viewing Table 4 and Table 2 in the second part of the thesis (see Table 2, pp 23).
According to theory, the use of external incentives in a policy is more likely to
cause  resistance  and  poor  implementation  in  target  countries,  as  opposed  to  social
learning or  lesson-drawing measures  that  would be less  domestically contested  (see
Table  4).  Sadly,  the  external  incentives  model  of  conditionality  has  been  the  core
implementation measure in ENP framework, however, the author does not see external
incentives  and  bargaining  as  such being  the  core  problem of  ENP implementation.
Instead,  there  are  two  internal  structural  issues  with  EU  conditionality  in  ENP in
general.
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Table 4. Theoretical conditions in the light of empirical findings167
Category of
research
Conditions and rules:
effectiveness depends on/varies with...
ENP implementation
(effect on ENP's performance)
Internal
structural
factors
in the EU
Implementation measures (external 
incentives and bargaining is more likely to 
cause domestic resistance and poor 
implementation)
External incentives conditionality, 
motivation issues in partner 
countries, EaP in particular
(negative in most cases)
The consistency of EU offer 
(cost-benefit calculations of target 
governments depend on the consistency of 
conditionality)
EU inconsistency in conditionality 
application (Armenia, financing), 
reluctance to deliver, EU self-
interest, no consensus, no focus
(negative in some cases)
EU rules' compliance within the EU and 
with international rules (the more an EU 
rule is supported within the EU, the more 
likely third countries will accept)
Promoting European values, 
respected among member states, 
but not shared by third countries
(positive in most cases)
International
influence
Possibility of alternatives (external 
governance can only be effective when 
there is no credible alternative to EU 
integration)
Customs Union as an alternative for
EaP countries, religious 
fundamentalism in the South
(negative in most cases)
International structures of power
EU role as a soft power, Russian 
foreign politics and influence
(negative in some cases)
Interdependence between the EU and third 
countries (if mutual interdependence is 
high, external governance is more effective)
Historical interdependence between
certain countries
(positive in some cases)
Domestic
factors
in partner
countries
Domestic structures and political regime 
of third countries (democracy promotion, 
through political conditionality, is more 
effective in at least partly democratised 
countries)
Authoritarian regimes, lack of 
democracy, national conflicts, ENP 
more successful in reformist 
countries (Moldova, Georgia)
(negative in most cases)
Perceived legitimacy of EU rules
(if EU rules are seen as legitimate, they are 
more likely accepted)
Issues with democratic deficit and 
Muslim minorities within the EU
(negative in some cases)
EU rules' compatibility with domestic 
institutions (compatible EU rule is more 
likely accepted)
EU rule accepted in countries that 
are similar to EU
(positive in some cases)
167Author's own compilation, based on theory development in chapter 2. External governance theory in
European Union studies, and literature review in chapter 3. Problems in European Neighbourhood
Policy implementation
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First, despite the EU favouring positive conditionality over a negative one, the absence
of a membership perspective or any other attractive model of cooperation has caused
motivation issues in partner countries, especially in the Eastern dimension (see Table 4,
pp 40). The deputy prime minister of Moldova has recently urged the EU to offer a
membership  perspective  to  EaP countries  that  are  willing,  eligible  and  capable  of
performing168.  With the argument of the Western Balkan countries'  fast development
during their pre-accession, she sees the accession prospect creating a sense of direction
and having a mobilising effect which is what these countries need to continue on the
course of pro-European reforms. This has come up in Ukraine's case as well where the
„absence of membership prospect was (...) a major factor governing relations with the
EU, as regularly expressed by government leaders and officials“169. The author agrees
with this critique: if governments in ENP target countries would have a clearly defined
attractive outcome of what are they conducting reforms for, they would probably be
more  devoted  to  modernisation,  and  if  the  EU  wishes  to  enforce  democratic
developments in its neighbourhood, it would not have much choice but to offer target
countries a motivation that they need.
Second, the EU should be more consistent when applying conditionality, which it
so far has had issues with (see Table 4, pp 40). On one hand, the EU has deviated from
their  political  requirements  by launching AA negotiations  with  a  country that  faces
pervasive  corruption,  bribery,  nepotism,  biased  media  environment,  problems  with
unjust vote count, for instance, Armenia170. The EU pre-condition of negotiating AAs
with functioning electoral democracies has led Armenians to “struggle to understand
how the EU can classify their country as democratic”171. On the other hand, the EU has
acted  on  the  opposite  by  being  reluctant  to  open  borders  and  markets  to  enable
preferential  trade relations  (see Table 4,  pp 40).  Expectations on the policy in  ENP
partner  countries  “mostly  relate  to  liberalising  trade  (in  agricultural  products)  and
facilitating  migration  –  topics  that  the  member  states  often  find  difficult  to  agree
168EurActiv (2014) „Moldova Deputy PM: EU membership perspective is 'a matter of urgent necessity'
for Eastern countries“, 18.03.2014
169Ünal Eriş, Öner, 2013:69
170Freedom House website: www.freedomhouse.org/country/armenia
171Babayan, 2011:3
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upon”172. In that sense, the EU's hesitance to deliver might rather derive from the variety
of  its  member  states'  national  interests  and  sovereignty  concerns,  than  from target
countries' performance. Regardless, owing to these two examples of inconsistency, the
sincerity of EU in affirming ENP conditionality has become questionable.
The  pattern  of  how  financial  assistance  is  distributed  across  ENP  partner
countries  adds  to  internal  structural  problems.  For  example,  in  2012,  Palestine  –  a
territory that has not been internationally recognised as a country, let alone a stable one
– was entitled to a financial support of €156 million under the ENPI bilateral envelop,
plus additional funds via thematic programmes, such as €42 million for interventions,
€16.75 million for humanitarian assistance and €11 million for food safety, to name a
few. All funding combined, this adds up to a total of €243.25 million in 2012. At the
same time, the total  budget of 2011-2013 for Georgia – that in 2012 struggled with
corruption and internal security but was moving towards consolidating a democracy –
was €180.7 million. Even with the extra funding of €22 million via EaPIC programme,
Georgia's share of €67.566 million a year was more than three times smaller compared
to the total of what was allocated to Palestine.173
This illustrates a controversy that can occur with the use of conditionality model:
it  can  develop an  opposite  impression  that  more  financial  support  is  needed  where
democratic reforms are more costly. According to this logic, assistance to authoritarian
countries where progress is slower and development levels are lower, would be larger
than the incentives offered to more modernised countries. This could inevitably send a
message that less progress ensures more funds174 and in some cases thereby reverse the
initial aim of conditionality to foster economic and political development.
Given the variety of national interests not only in the neighbouring countries but
within the EU as well, it has been challenging to establish consensus and a clear focus
in ENP (see Table 4, pp 40). Although ENP is probably one of the few instances in the
172Maurer,  Heidi,  Simão,  Licínia,  „From  Regional  Power  to  Global  Power?  The  European
Neighbourhood Policy after the Lisbon Treaty“, p 103; in Boening, Astrid, Kremer, Jan-Frederik, van
Loon, Aukje (2013) „Global Power Europe – Vol. 1. Theoretical and Institutional Approaches to the
EU's External Relations“, Springer
173European Commission's website: ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation
174Veebel, Viljar (2012) „The role and impact of positive conditionality in the EU pre-accession policy“,
Dissertationes Rerum Politicarum Universitatis Tartuensis n5, supervisor: Eiki Berg, Tartu University
Press:19
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Union's external action where the EU member states tend to have the least differences of
opinion, it still lacks unanimity. The Baltic states support integration with the Union's
Eastern neighbours, while UK's protectionist stance on immigration is likely to oppose
further EU enlargement. Southern EU member states, such as Italy or Spain lobby for
greater mobility and economic relations with Mediterranean neighbourhood, while in
some cases, like UK, terrorist incidents are associated with Islamic extremists, which
develops reluctance to facilitating migration with the Union's Southern neighbours.
However,  they seem to agree at  least  on one thing.  ENP is  about  promoting
European values in its near abroad and there are no evident issues with their compliance
within the EU member states (see Table 4, pp 40). Rule of law, democracy, free and fair
elections,  sustainable  economic  development,  human  rights  and  civil  freedoms  are
respected across the EU. Then again, an issue does come up regarding Europeanisation
outside the Union, especially in countries whose governments do not share the same
values as the EU does. In the Mediterranean, Islam does not necessarily exclude the
possibility of democratisation, as seen in Morocco's case, but it has been difficult to
establish respect for fundamental political rights and civil liberties in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) – historically the least free region in the world175. Even in the
East dimension, respect for human rights and gender equality is not easily established in
Azerbaijan where traditionally women have not enjoyed the same rights as men.
The adoption of EU values as well as ENP's effectiveness seems to be related to
the countries' political regime which is what  reform process and the EU's capacity to
foster democratic development depends the most of (see Table 4, pp 40). For example,
countries that do not have an AP in place – Libya, Syria and Belarus, as established in
the  first  part  of  the  thesis  –,  tend  to  have  the  lowest  level  of  civil  freedom  and
democracy: Syria and Belarus are considered to be the least free in the world 176. This
correlation might as well be interpreted the other way around: countries that cooperate
with the EU on the basis of APs are also more oriented towards becoming democratic.
In  that  case,  the  argument  could  work  in  favour  of  the  EU's  effectiveness  in
democratising its neighbourhood.
External governance is said to be more effective in at least partly democratised
175Freedom House website: www.freedomhouse.org/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa 
176Freedom in the World 2013 indexes for Syria and Belarus: 7.0 and 6.5, respectively (the least free: 10)
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countries, and indeed, ENP has been more advantageous and profitable in countries that
were already in a  reformist  mood,  determined to develop or  partly democratised  to
begin with (see Table 4, pp 40). For example, Moldova, with the highest freedom rating
among EaP countries177, has been on a steady transition towards democracy. Conducting
continuous political and judicial reforms in their society that has resulted in gradual EU
integration:  from visa facilitation agreements  in  2008 and a Mobility Partnership in
2010 to the outlook of signing association pact by autumn 2014178. At the same time, in
countries that lack democracy, ENP's effectiveness in good governance promotion has
been limited (see Table 4, pp 40). For example,  Belarus and Azerbaijan, both with the
lowest freedom ratings among EaP countries179, have not achieved much progress on
democratic governance or human rights reform180, while Armenia's authoritarian style of
governance has been reinforced in the aftermath of contested presidential elections181.
As established in the second part of the thesis, once a country has started down
an authoritarian track, the cost of reversal for democracy is high. Reforms required in
ENP conditionality  imply  a  series  of  costs  for  target  countries  in  any case,  but  in
authoritarian  regimes,  more  large-scale  changes  are  needed  to  establish  a  deep  and
comprehensive electoral democracy, which is where the cost of meeting EU norms and
values in the ENP framework is higher than in party democratised countries. This idea
of path dependence could explain why the conditionality model has sometimes given
the impression that less progress leads to more financial aid, as explained previously. It
also raises the issue of EU offer and motivation – the reward for development needs to
exceed the cost of it, for authoritarian countries to take on the costly reform process.
The perception of EU as well as the perceived legitimacy of EU rules in third
countries varies across the neighbourhood. In some cases, it is related to the EU's role in
addressing regional and national problems, in others, the perception is affected by how
their nation is perceived and treated within the Union. Armenia is a good example of
how an ENP partner country can see the EU's role as a potential solution to regional
177Freedom in the World 2013 index for Moldova and Georgia: 3.0
178Council  of  the  European  Union  (2013)  „14th  EU-Georgia  Cooperation  Council“,  Press  release,
Brussels, 12.12.2013
179Freedom in the World 2013 indexes for Belarus and Azerbaijan: 6.5 and 6.0, respectively
180European Commission, 2014b; European Commission (2014c) “ENP Country Progress Report 2013 –
Azerbaijan”, Memo 14/221, Brussels, 27.03.2014
181Nasieniak, Depo, 2013:8
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security  issues.  However,  in  practice,  “given  its  economic  and  security  interests,  it
would be problematic for the EU explicitly to take sides in the [Nagorno-Karabakh]
conflict”182, which could be the reason why the EU's contribution to conflict resolution
in South Caucasus has been rather marginal and mainly diplomatic.
Addressing regional conflicts is one of the areas where EU member states have
had trouble with reaching a consensus and have therefore remained cautious. In some
cases, the EU has been even avoiding discussion on sensitive areas. In its relations with
Morocco, while Western Sahara has been mentioned among the unresolved conflicts in
the world, has not even been mentioned in EU-Morocco bilateral AP, instead, it remains
outside  of  the focus  of  Morocco-specific  policy papers183.  Then again,  the  EU as  a
primarily economic union, in principle, does not serve the purpose of solving conflicts
in  third  countries  per  se,  nor  has  the  competences  or  means  needed  to  conduct  a
successful  intervention.  International  community  as  well  as  ENP partners  seem  to
expect more from the EU as a “security community” than they can actually offer.
The perceived legitimacy of EU rules is affected by how the EU member states
themselves respect values they promote. In some ENP countries, the perception of EU is
related to how their nationals are treated within the EU  (see Table 4, pp 40). Egyptians,
for  instance,  see  some  EU member  states  being  discriminative  or  harmful  towards
Muslim minorities in their societies which has contributed to Egypt's unwillingness to
engage with the EU. They also see the EU as essentially divided and largely following
the US' lead in most of its policies in MENA countries. Then again, the majority of
Muslims are not aware of the EU's policies and initiatives in the Mediterranean which
makes their perception of the EU rather precarious.184
The  EU  has  been  criticised  for  democratic  deficit  within  its  various  bodies
because of their seeming inaccessibility to ordinary citizens, which makes requesting
democratic reforms in ENP partner countries seem contradicting (see Table 4, pp 40).
Restrictive policies, such as  banning religious clothing and head-wear in France and
Belgium,  requiring  a  statement  to  be  signed by immigrants  upon arrival  to  respect
182Babayan, 2011:3
183Carafa, Korhonen, 2008:9
184Shahin, Emad El-Din (2007) „Political  Islam in Egypt“,  CEPS Working Document, No 266, May
2007:5-9
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individual freedoms and gender equality in Denmark185, or anti-Muslim demonstrations
and  attacks  against  Muslim  women  in  France186 may  leave  the  impression  of
Islamophobia  and  discrimination  within  the  EU.  The  fact  that  ENP conditionality
requires  democratic  reforms  and  non-discriminative  society  to  be  established  in  its
partner countries, may be interpreted as EU double standards and puts the legitimacy of
EU rules, at least in the Mediterranean, into question.
In order to assess how well are EU rules compatible with domestic institutions in
third countries, one would need to study this in each country's case individually (see
Table 4,  pp 41). At this point, the author would take the idea of compatibility further by
saying  that  similarities  between  a  target  country  and  the  EU  increase  ENP's
effectiveness which actually combines the arguments of sharing EU values and their
level of democracy. ENP has been more successful in countries that are culturally more
similar to EU member states and that lie geographically closer to the EU which also
favours migration. For instance, Romanian, one of the official languages of the EU, is
also a native language in Moldova – a country that lies in the geographical proximity of
EU, is motivated for EU integration and has become the most modernised ENP partner.
However, given the Soviet past and a large Russian-speaking minority in all EaP
countries,  including  Moldova,  Russian  foreign  policy  has  influenced  the  countries'
democratic transition and relations to the EU (see Table 4, pp 40). Extensive cultural,
economic and security linkages, asymmetries in size and power that favour Russia, its
support for NGOs, political parties, cultural foundations, or even local governments in
places  like  Crimea187,  may “legitimize  and  reinforce  authoritarian  elements  in  their
policies”188. Visa-free regime and the knowledge of Russian language and traditions has
favoured  Azerbaijani  migration  to  Russia  rather  than  to  the  EU189.  In  addition  to
inevitable historical linkages, Russia has been using trade restrictions to undermine EaP
185Benton, Meghan, Nielsen, Anne (2013) „Integrating Europe's Muslim Minorities: Public Anxieties,
Policy Responses“, Migration Policy Institute, 10.05.2013
186Muhammad, Marwan, Ray, Elsa, Privot, Michaël (2013) „Anti-Muslim violence: A wakeup call for
European governments“, EUObserver, 30.07.2013
187Wilson, Andrew, Popescu, Nicu (2010) „Russian and European neighbourhood policies compared“, p
97; in Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios (2010) „The Security Context in the Black Sea Region“, Routledge
188Cameron,  David  R.,  Orenstein,  Mitchell  (2012)  „Post-Soviet  Authoritarianism:  The  Influence  of
Russia in its ‘Near Abroad’“, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol 28(1):2
189Allahveranov, Azer, Huseynov, Emin (2013) „Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility Between the EU
and  the  Eastern  Partnership  Counntries.  Country  report:  Azerbaijan“,  CASE  Network  Studies  &
Analyses, No 460:36
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success190,  such  as  the previously mentioned bans  on Moldovan wine  and Georgian
chocolate in 2013 before the Vilnius summit.
In Armenia's case, Russian capital, subsidy and low-price gas distribution is an
offer that the economic cooperation in the ENP framework can not match191, which is
probably why the country announced a wish to join the Russian-led Customs Union in
September  2013.  Given  the  external  policy's  context-dependence,  its  effectiveness
varies  with  possible  regional  competition  and can  only be  successful  if  there  is  no
credible alternative to EU integration – in that sense, the Customs Union might become
a challenge (see Table 4, pp 40). Russia “has developed a neighbourhood policy of its
own that combines soft and hard power and is backed by more time and resources than
the EU is currently willing to commit”192. Compared to Russia, Europe is not a military
superpower – and does  not  even wish to  become one193 –,  therefore,  the EU is  not
treated as a strategic  actor,  as  one of  the great  powers  or  a  pole in  the multi-polar
world194. Instead, it is perceived as a soft power player (see Table 4, pp 40) which may
make the EU integration seem less attractive for countries that were hoping for greater
EU contribution to regional security (i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan).
In the Mediterranean, however, Russia's influence remains limited to occasional
contribution to conflict resolution. There are some regional organisations that include a
number  of  EuroMed  countries,  such  as  the  African  Union,  however,  these  are  not
considered  as  regional  competition  that  would  undermine  ENP's  effectiveness.  The
main obstruction to modernisation and reform in the Southern dimension tends to be the
religious  fundamentalism.  Islamic  values  are  deeply  established  in  the  countries'
societies and are therefore difficult to be uprooted or changes. Therefore, EU policies in
the Mediterranean have been more focused on  economy, environment, energy, health,
migration and culture, i.e. the soft security areas.
Political and  economic  interdependence  between  the  Union  and  its
neighbourhood  is  one  of  the  few  conditions  that  has  worked  in  favour  of  ENP's
190Emerson, 2014:11
191Babayan, 2011:2
192Wilson, Popescu, 2010:96; in Triantaphyllou, 2010
193Tuimioja,  Erkki  (2009)  „The Role  of  Soft  Power  in  EU Common Foreign Policy“,  International
Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin 30.07.2009
194Biscop, 2013:3
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effectiveness in some cases (see Table 4, pp 40) like Moldova, Georgia and Morocco.
Morocco is a former French colony and is therefore the only ENP partner country where
French is spoken as a second language by many Moroccans. Since the country has been
considered to be the only state in North Africa that has launched crucial reforms towards
democratisation, it could owe some of its success to language and cultural relations with
France. Moldova and Georgia have both pursued Europe-oriented trade relations since
they gained independence in 1991 which has contributed to economic interdependence.
Then again,  historical interdependence with Libya,  a former Italian colony, or
Egypt, Jordan and Palestinian territories that were once a part of the British empire, has
not added much to these countries' success in stabilisation or development. And Belarus,
on the contrary, due to violations of electoral standards and human rights, has become
rather isolated in European continent, where bilateral political relations are limited to
statements, resolutions, nominations of mutual claims and complaints195.  Then again,
mutual interdependence is inevitably lower with countries that have not signed an AP
and therefore remain outside most of the ENP structures: Libya, Syria and Belarus.
Interdependence,  connectedness  and  migration  between  the  partner  countries
themselves has also affected their ability to meet ENP conditionality. For example, in
the South, it has caused „Lebanon and Jordan [to] struggle with the impact of the Syrian
civil war on their political, economic and social systems, seriously compromising their
ability to carry out political and structural reforms“196. In the East, Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict has produced the largest number of refugees and internally displaced persons
(IDPs) in South Caucasus region, while “language, cultural similarities and geographic
proximity between Azerbaijan and Turkey [has] underpinned the decision of many to
migrate to Turkey”197. Same applies to historical interdependence between Azerbaijan
and Russia. The fact that domestic political unrest or conflicts in a country inevitably
affect democratic processes in its cross-border neighbourhood, supports the EU's idea
behind ENP to avoid the spill-over of instability and problems from its neighbourhood
into the Union.
195Yahorau, Andrei (2011) „Who has benefited from the implementation of the neighbourhood policy in
Belarus?“, Belarusian Political Science Review, No 1:215
196European Commission, 2014a:2
197Allahveranov, Huseynov, 2013:30,36
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External governance theory to some extent differs from ENP performance: there
are issues found in ENP research that were not addressed by the theory and vice versa.
The issue of ENP containing two conflicting objectives – security and integration vs
managing accession aspirations – was seen as an essential deficiency in ENP literature
along with  the  inappropriateness  of  the  one-size  fits-all  structure  and ENP's  budget
constraints, yet, external governance theorists did not expect these to play a crucial role
in  determining  the  policy's  overall  effectiveness.  However,  given  the  diverse
backgrounds  of  target  countries,  ENP has  resulted  in  patterns  of  differentiated  EU
integration and a multi-speed ENP, as Lavenex had predicted for external governance198.
Then again, there are theoretical assumptions that were not seen as problematic
in ENP research. According to theory, the more an EU rule is supported within the EU
and in line with international  rules,  the more likely third countries will  accept.  The
values promoted via ENP are based on democracy and development that are supported
across Europe and the West:  rule of law, free and fair  elections, human rights, civil
freedoms,  fight  against  corruption,  market  economy,  sustainable  economic
development, political and economic stability – none of which is contested within the
EU. There are no evident internal compliance issues that could affect ENP performance.
A major difference is the core of what is shared beyond EU borders: elements of
external governance rely on rule transfer, whereas ENP is based on values. As opposed
to pre-accession, ENP does not extend the Union's legal boundaries or thrive for EU
rule  transfer  as  such,  but  is  more  based  on  promoting  good  governance,  economic
development and democracy. Then again, it has been put into question whether using a
value-based narrative is even fit for external action purposes or not199. It could be that
ENP's ineffectiveness derives from these dissimilarities. If ENP were to meet each of
the external governance effectiveness conditions, would it then be more successful?
In  fact,  hypothetically,  if  the  EU  were  to  use  social  learning  in  ENP
implementation, be consistent in what they offer, would not face regional competition or
credible alternatives to EU integration, would be considered as a powerful international
player and have an equally high interdependence with all ENP partner countries, would
the policy then be successful in establishing an associated area of peaceful, prosperous,
198See chapter 2.2. Elements and variations of external governance model
199Biscop, 2013:3
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democratic, secure, politically and economically stable countries around EU external
border? Regional competition was limited in Lebanon, but  promoting democracy has
not  succeeded due to insufficient ENP incentives,  Lebanon's  political  instability and
human rights issues200. In Ukraine, ENP conditionality with no membership perspective
has not transformed state structures and policies nor helped stabilise Ukrainian domestic
politics201, owing to the country's political polarisation and Russian presence.  On the
examples of Lebanon, Ukraine, as well as Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Libya or Syria,
the author feels that a strong policy structure might not be enough to succeed, if the will
for EU integration is not shared by stable governments in its target countries.
If  the  EU  were  to  update  the  policy  at  its  best  to  meet  these  effectiveness
conditions, there are still aspects that the EU can not change. This goes for any kind of
external  influence  –  regardless  of  how  structurally  competitive  and  legitimate  an
external policy might be, it remains vulnerable towards international power structures,
regional alternatives and domestic factors in its target countries. Moreover, there are
countries  where ENP has  succeeded,  in  spite  the  policy's  internal  contradictions  or
international influence of Russian foreign policy, such as Moldova and Georgia. Since
in ENP's case, external policy's effectiveness depends more on external factors than on
the policy's own structure, the hypothesis stated in the beginning of the thesis, is proved.
4.2. Generalisations and conclusions
It is somewhat demanding to assess ENP performance and pinpoint the reasons for its
little effectiveness, even on the basis of external governance theory. Given the strategic
importance  of  the  near  abroad and current  problematic  situations  in  several  partner
countries, such as Ukraine, Armenia, Belarus, Egypt, Libya or Syria – especially due to
a momentous change in Crimea and the vast unpredictability of Russian foreign policy
in  the  common  neighbourhood  –,  ENP's  effectiveness  in  establishing  stability  and
security in the region is undoubtedly of great importance for the EU. These countries
can not be regarded as neutral, but neither can they be ignored.
200Sensenig-Dabbous, Eugene, El-Hindy, Elie,  Hourani,  Guita (2013) Case study: Lebanon, p 56; in
Benedek, et al., 2013
201Ünal Eriş, Öner, 2013:72
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Even  though  the  list  of  domestic  problems  in  third  countries  that  affect
democratic reform profess, is shorter than the policy's internal contradictions, the key
factor lies in the partner countries. Authoritarian political regimes, politically unsettled
governments, countries' own vision on their relations with the EU, lack of democracy,
and domestic cost of reforms that hinder modernisation and reform. It is also something
that  the EU can not  change or  improve on their  end which is  why the author  sees
domestic factors in partner countries as the main determinants for ENP's effectiveness.
However, recent setbacks, conflicts and events do not necessarily mean that the
policy in general has failed, as some of the authors have stated. One could argue that the
situation would be much worse if ENP was never introduced to begin with. After all, the
DCFTAs were finalised with Moldova and Georgia in November 2013 which indicate
economic development in these countries and is an important step in further enhancing
their cooperation with the EU. Progress has also been achieved in visa facilitation and
mobility  partnership  between  the  EU  and  some  of  its  Eastern  neighbours,  such  as
Azerbaijan. These step-by-step accomplishments should not be underestimated.
In order partner countries to take on the costly reform process, the advantage of
preferential trade relations has to exceed the cost of it. While the EU has been hesitant
to  deliver  benefits,  but  expecting  large-scale  democratic  reforms  and  economic
developments from ENP partners, it “requires much of the neighbours and offers vague
incentives in return, making it unlikely that ENP can meet its core objectives”202. The
external incentives model of conditionality has not been resultant when there is no clear
result or a guaranteed benefit, which goes for all ENP partner countries.
As stated in introduction, ENP is likely to affect its target countries as well as EU
members more than they can expect. Advancing economic integration, trade relations
and migration would make EU Single Market accessible to third countries. Greater EU
integration and signing of AAs with Eastern partners could cause dissatisfaction or even
antagonisation in Russia. And if the EU – already including patterns from pre-accession
in ENP – would offer membership to ENP target countries, the policy would have been
preparing new members for the EU all along. To all intents and purposes, the ENP's
importance for the partner countries, as well as for the EU, can not be disregarded.
202Smith, 2005a, Abstract
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4.3. Challenges and recommendations
EU  internal  requirements  in  foreign  policy  are  often  different  from what  the  ENP
countries expect to receive via ENP. In that sense, the EU needs to focus more on the
actual needs and different situations of the target countries, as opposed to following the
member states' interests or prior institutional decisions. The EU should end its tendency
to treat countries in its neighbourhood with “simplistic uniformity”203. Furthermore, the
influence of traditional cooperation patterns and interdependence relations that shape
the preferences of EU member states, should not affect the focus of the EU as a group
when it  comes to  ENP. Ideally,  the policy should always  have  a  clear  focus,  not  a
volatile attention that shifts between two dimensions or single countries.
When it comes to visa-liberalisation and delivering conditional rewards on the
EU's end, the EU has to overcome migration fears. Current xenophobic protectionist
attitudes, especially towards immigrants from Islamic countries, are preventing the EU
from developing a constructive win-win approach to migration204. It is not just about the
increasing social burden on national governments or rising unemployment – it could
actually  help  solve  demographic  problems  within  the  Union,  since  there  are  skill
shortages  in  many  sectors,  such  as  health,  science,  engineering  or  agriculture,  for
example the need for medical nurses in Germany. The Commissioners have stated that
the EU even needs more immigration to remain globally competitive205.
There  is  a  theoretical  link  between  ENP and  the  Union's  external  action  in
general, however, it has not translated to practice as well as it could. In order to address
regional disputes efficiently,  such as Transnistria,  Nagorno-Karabakh,  South Ossetia,
Abkhazia, or Western Sahara, Dr Huff suggests combining political and non-political
instruments like CSDP and ENP with EEAS to set  concrete and politically realistic
policy aims for solving these conflicts206. There have been short-term CSDP missions in
some cases in Eastern Europe, but these resolutions need a long-term agenda in order to
be sustainable, which is something that the ENP and EaP could potentially project.
203Babayan, 2011:4
204Fischer, Lannon, 2011:4
205Malmström, Cecilia, László, Andor (2010) „EU must remain open to migration“, European Voice, Vol
16(45):9
206Huff, 2011:5
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The EU's ability to conduct a more successful ENP in future depends on how
does the EU develop internally and globally.  There will be periods that are probably
going to draw more focus on the Eastern Partnership, such as Latvian and Estonian EU
Presidencies in  2015 and 2018, respectively,  and there will  be periods when certain
events in  the proximate neighbouring countries attract  attention to certain countries.
Developments in Russian foreign politics and Customs Union ambitions will probably
impinge the ENP performance in the region. External influence is not something that the
EU can control or change, but what they can do, is develop a strong and focused policy
on their end, which is what the new ENI attempts to establish.
ENP critique has addressed two conflicting points at the same time: the policy's
one-size fits-all  structure being inappropriate to address partner  countries'  individual
problems and the Union's inconsistency in conditionality application, i.e. prioritisation
of selected cooperation areas with certain countries that has led to different patterns of
EU integration  across  the  neighbourhood.  Would  it  even be  possible  for  the  EU to
establish a policy that would be able to address each country's domestic problems and
peculiarities, without being accused of unequal approach or self-interest? The author
sees these as two mutually exclusive events that pose a challenging dilemma for the
already internally incoherent Union.
Although the findings suggest some tentative conclusions on ENP's problems and
possible reasons why the policy has not been as successful as hoped, similar to studies
in social science, they are still subject to debate and require further research. The thesis
offers  generalisations  about  the  policy's  implementation,  however,  since  its  main
conclusion  is  that  the  policy's  effectiveness  depends  on  domestic  factors  in  partner
countries,  a case study of each country would be highly eloquent for drawing more
specific  conclusions.  An in-depth  analysis  would enable  to  narrow down  individual
problems in each country's case in particular.
Additionally, the author acknowledges that the findings are rather dependent in
empirical evidence that is used. On an open research topic like the ENP is, there are
numerous different and sometimes conflicting opinions being published. For example,
upon  using  EU  official  documents  as  sources  for  arguments,  one  would  not  find
problems in the ENP structure or issues with using conditionality, that might, in turn, be
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the core critique of some scientific articles. It has been challenging to limit the amount
of literature, even when concentrating on recent critical publications. The amount of
articles,  policy  reviews  and  reports  is  overwhelming  and  definitely  needs  further
systematisation of some sort.
Further research on external governance and ENP's effectiveness would need to
go beyond a policy analysis as conducted in this paper. It would be resultant to compare
the conditions for an effective external governance on the basis of individual countries
or  a  case study by using  primary sources.  Domestic  conditions  for  effective  policy
implementation and rule transfer in third countries could use further investigation of
some sort which would be a highly beneficial contribution to ENP research.
4.4. Renewed approach in European Neighbourhood Policy
In 2011, the High Representative and the Commission published a Joint Communication
where the EU institution noted some points of improvement needed in ENP207. Same
year, the Commission put forward a legislative proposal208 for a new ENI that entails
updates, revision and improvements in the ENP framework for the upcoming 2014-2020
period,  adopted  in  the  Council  and the  Parliament  in  March 2014.  Next,  the  thesis
provides  insight  to  the  main  principles  and  changes  that  the  new  ENI  entails,  in
comparison with the current problems found in the previous parts of the thesis.
First, the “more for more” principle along with the differentiation clause is the
key aspect of the new ENI209. This gives conditionality and “reinforcement by reward”
model, reviewed in the second part  of the thesis, a meaningful output by increasing
support  to  those  partners  who  are  more  successful  in  a  broad  and  comprehensive
democratisation  process.  When  each  country  would  be  supported,  evaluated  and
rewarded individually,  financial distribution would need to do the same, as opposed to
the current division of ENP budget between the East and the South dimensions. Instead,
207Joint Communication by the High Representative of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security
Policy and the European Commission (2011), „A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A
review of European Neighbourhood Policy“, COM(2011) 303, Brussels, 25.05.2011
208European Commission  (2011) „Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument“, 2011/0405(COD), Brussels, 07.12.2011
209Ibid., p 2, 9, 17, 35, Article 4
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the EU would “allocate a greater proportion of funds where aid can have the highest
impact”210. These elements of differentiation could potentially solve two of the main
points  of EU critique found in the third part  of the thesis  – differentiating between
countries would allow the EU to better adjust its assistance to the partner countries own
needs and progress211 and increase partner countries' motivation and make.
Second essential update regards the structural  design of  the instrument,  since
ENP programming and evaluating process has  so  far  been  too complex and time-
consuming. Each country not only agrees on a bilateral AP of priorities and goals, but
also receives annual progress reports that may take over a year to conclude and in some
cases contain similar suggestions as the AP does. During  evaluation and consultations
when signing up for ENP partnership, Country Strategy Papers are issued, involving an
in-depth situation analysis in each country. This adds up the average of 18 months212 for
all requirements and reports to be initialled, concluded, translated and signed.
Therefore, the Commission proposes to streamline, shorten and better focus the
programming  process, simply to deliver support to ENP partner  countries faster213.
Fields of cooperation and financial support would be more policy-driven and would
vary across countries, depending on which critical areas need the most assistance. The
focus  may  be,  for  example,  on  human rights, fundamental freedoms, progressive
economic  growth  and integration to the EU internal market, security, confidence
building, prevention and settlement of conflicts, support for increased people to people
contacts, sectoral cooperation (energy, climate change) or civil society214. If cooperation
focuses on key policy objectives, particularly set out in the APs, EU support would be
more relevant and efficient.
Third,  the  ENP should  be  more  linked  with  actual  internal  policies  in  both,
partner countries and the EU. Establishing closer links with EU internal programmes
would enable partner countries and their citizens to participate for example in student
mobility,  youth  programmes  or  other  activities  engaging  civic  society215.  When
210EU Neighbourhood Info Centre: www.enpi-info.eu
211Ibid.
2122011/0405(COD):3
213Ibid., p 3, 35
214EU Neighbourhood Info Centre: www.enpi-info.eu
215Ibid.
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introducing the ENP package in March 2014, EU Commissioner Štefan Füle noted the
importance  of  these  people-to-people  contacts:  “by  engaging  directly  with  people,
opening travel and study opportunities for citizens, and promoting networking between
communities (business, research, universities, arts, culture, etc.), in addition supporting
civil  society,  EU policy can act  as a  catalyst  in  this  process  [of]  transition towards
democracy and more inclusive societies”216.
Fourth, given Russia's  improved fiscal situation in the past  years and less need
for large volumes of financial assistance,  Russia's position is to be revised in terms of
receiving funding. Russia is a special case when it comes to ENP – they did not want to
be approached by the EU under the same policy as Azerbaijan, Jordan  or Egypt for
example, and therefore, they are not part of the EaP countries, as such. However, Russia
included as a recipient of bilateral, multi-country and cross-border ENPI funding, which
made  Russia the only beneficiary of ENPI that is not covered by ENP217.  Bilateral
support to Russia has been marginal in the last four years and since Russia aspires more
to a relationship of equals, the country has become a donor itself218. Although „Russia's
eligibility  for  regional  and  Cross-Border  Cooperation  programmes  is  retained  (...),
bilateral cooperation will be addressed (...) under the new Partnership Instrument (PI)219
– a major innovation of the 2014-2020 external instruments package“220.
Whether these updates in the policy will  bring about a more successful ENP,
remains to be seen. The new ENI addresses significant points of improvement in areas
that the EU was criticised for, namely regarding the lack of motivation, conditionality,
not delivering benefits or the one-size fits-all structure. It shows a degree of docility
within the EU, but it would take seven years of implementation and even longer to see
actual results in practice. This institutional attempt to increase the policy's effectiveness
would need to be supported by changes in member states' attitudes and governments in
partner countries as well, and this is where the EU faces a number of challenges.
216European Commission, 2014a
2172011/0405(COD):4
218Ibid., p 4
219PI aims to advance and promote EU interests by supporting the external dimension of internal policies
in strategic partner countries such as Russia, e.g. competiveness, research and innovation, migration,
and to address major global challenges, e.g. energy security, climate change and environment.
220EU Neighbourhood Info Centre: www.enpi-info.eu
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Conclusion
A policy that covers 16 countries via similar incentives is already an ambitious one, not
just because of economic and social diversity of the partners, but the fact that the six
countries in Eastern Europe are to some extent seen as potential EU members, while for
the  ten  Mediterranean,  accession  perspective  is  very unlikely.  There  is  no  common
understanding or definition of ENP: some say it is a substitute for enlargement, a pre-
accession, a security community, development cooperation, creating a ring of friends or
a buffer zone between the EU's inside and outside. However, they all seem to agree on
one thing: ten years of the policy's implementation has not been as successful as hoped.
The  systematisation  of  ENP  research  in  this  paper  contributes  to  our
understanding of ENP effectiveness by highlighting and categorising popular problems
in the light  of effectiveness  conditions from external  governance theory.  It  helps to
eventually narrow down not just the problems of the policy, but the key aspects that
actually determine the success of ENP. Identifying internal structural issues within the
EU is an essential prerequisite for possible improvements in future. 
The main internal structural problems that have hindered ENP's effectiveness are
the EU's inconsistency when applying external incentives conditionality, following EU
member states' historic preferences and economic interests rather than partner countries'
needs,  the  policy's  one-size  fits-all  structure  that  has  not  been  able  to  address  the
countries' individual national problems and challenges, the constraints of EU budget,
and the lack of consensus, focus and commitment to delivering ENP benefits within the
EU. On one hand, seeking to maintain security and stability around EU external border,
but on the other, aiming to promote democratic developments in partner countries, it has
been argued that ENP is struggling to meet two sometimes conflicting objectives.
External  factors  that  influence  ENP's  course  include  international  power
structures and possible regional competition or alternatives to EU integration, such as
Russian  foreign  policy  and  Customs  Union  in  its  near  abroad.  ENP  success  is
determined  by  domestic  factors  in  partner  countries,  such  as  domestic  regime,  the
political will of national governments, the cost of democratic transition and EU rule
adoption – especially problematic and costly in authoritarian countries –, the extent to
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which they share EU values, national conflicts and the countries' own vision upon their
relations  to  the  EU,  be  them  membership  aspirations,  conflict  resolution,  visa-
liberalisation or advanced trade and mobility partnership.
Internal  contradictions  of  the policy affect  the perceived legitimacy of  EU in
these countries, however, they do not play as crucial role in determining the policy's
overall effectiveness as the political will of governments in target countries does. Even
if the ENP were to meet all other external governance effectiveness conditions, political
regime in partner countries remains the most widespread hindrance to political reform,
as seen in cases such as Lebanon, Syria, Libya, Belarus, Armenia, or Azerbaijan. As a
result of ENP research and analysis, the hypothesis was confirmed: external policy's
effectiveness depends more on external influence than on the policy's own structure.
The analysis points out challenges and recommendations on issues where the EU
could improve their stance, such as overcoming migration fears, using the theoretical
link between CFSP and EU external action, and focusing more on each partner country's
own development  levels  and needs,  rather  than  EU's  understanding  of  it.  Although
structural updates to the policy itself might not result in increased effectiveness in all
target  countries,  unless  the  partners  themselves  express  determination  to  develop,  a
clear focus, consistency in conditionality application, consensus among member states
and a motivating EU offer would be able to improve the perception of EU in partner
countries  that  might  eventually  lead  to  their  greater  dedication  to  modernisation.
Whether the new ENI will bring about a practical increase of the policy's effectiveness
in the next seven years or not, remains to be seen.
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Estonian abstract
Magistritöö autori eesmärgiks on leida põhjused Euroopa Liidu naabruspoliitika (ENP)
senisele ebaefektiivsusele. Kuna viimastel aastatel on esile kerkinud mitmeid probleeme
erinevates ENP sihtriikides ja Euroopa Liidus endas, on suurenenud ka kriitka osakaal
naabruspoliitika  uuringutes.  Käesolev  töö  püüab  süstematiseerida  negatiivseid
hinnanguid  poliitika  toimimisele  välise  valitsemise  (external  governance)  teooria
raamistikus.  Tuginedes  kahele  uurimisküsimusele  ja  võrreldes  efektiivse  välise
valitsemise  teoreetilisi  tingimusi  peamiste  ENP probleemidega,  leiab  uurimus  ENP
ebaedu peamised põhjused ja probleemid, mis määravad välise poliitika efektiivsuse.
Autori  isiklik  panus  väljendub  kõige  selgemalt  magistritöö  neljandas  osas,  kus
võrreldakse teoreetilisi  ootuseid ENP praktikaga,  analüüsitakse  peamiseid  probleeme
läbi  empiirilisele  tõestusmaterjali  ja  faktide  ning  seeläbi  leitakse  vastus  teisele
uurimisküsimusele.  ENP edukuse  osas  leiti  kõige  määravamaks  olevat  siseriiklikud
tegurid  partnerriikides,  eelkõige  sealne  poliitiline  režiim,  valitsuse  huvid,  vähene
demokratiseerituse  tase,  rahvuslikud  väljakutsed,  võimalikud  konfliktid  ja  suhted
naaberriikidega. Sellegipoolest, poliitika toimimisele avaldavad mõju ka EL sisemised
vastuolud  –  nagu  näiteks  järjepidevuse  ja  üksmeele  puudus  tingimuslikkuse
rakendamisel,  vastandlikud  eesmärgid,  ebasobiv  üldistusaste  ja  võimetus  pakkuda
motiveerivat tulemust ENP sihtriikidele – ja rahvusvahelised muutujad, näiteks kujutlus
EL-ist  kui  pehmest  võimust  (soft  power),  regionaalne  konkurents,  võimalikud
alternatiivid  EL  integratsioonile  (Customs  Union)  ja  Venemaa  välispoliitika  oma
lähinaabruses.  Analüüsi  tulemusena  leiab  kinnitust  hüpotees,  et  välise  poliitika
efektiivsus sõltub rohkem välistest teguritest kui poliitika sisemisest struktuurist.
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